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Abstract 
CARE began PROSPECT (Program of Support for Poverty Elimination and 
Community Transformation) in 1998.  PROSPECT aims to reduce poverty in peri-urban 
areas of Lusaka.  It employs a community-based approach to carry out three types of 
activities:  social empowerment (institution building at the local level), personal 
empowerment (microfinance), and infrastructure improvement (mostly water supply 
schemes). 
PROSPECT has attempted to carry out these activities largely through its support 
of area-based organizations (ABOs) that now form part of city government.  The zone 
development committees (ZDCs) and residents￿ development committees (RDCs) are the 
basic components of the ABO structure.  These are community-level representations of 
municipal government; they are the community￿s mechanisms for expressing its voice 
and driving development. 
PROSPECT is itself an extension of an earlier project, PUSH II (Peri-Urban Self-
Help Project).  PUSH II and PROSPECT are fundamentally about developing 
community-based and community-driven development (CDD) mechanisms and 
strengthening community capacities to identify and respond to community needs.  The 
paper examines the scaling-up experience of PUSH II and PROSPECT, looking 
especially at the mechanisms of CDD, the ABOs. 
Evolution of PUSH and PROSPECT 
 
PUSH I (1991￿94) was a food-for-work (FFW) program sponsored by the 
Government of Zambia, the World Food Programme (WFP), and the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA).  The objective of PUSH was to alleviate the 
negative effects of structural adjustment and stabilization and of the 1991￿92 drought on 
well-being and food security. 
In the second phase of PUSH, PUSH II (1994￿97), CARE sought to move from 
direct implementation to facilitation of implementation and to building the capacity of the   iii
community to identify development and act upon development needs.  A new donor, the 
United Kingdom￿s Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and CARE￿s senior 
staff encouraged this more community-driven approach.  PUSH II initiated work in three 
compounds in Lusaka in a learning and ￿process￿ project.  That is, communities 
determined project interventions only after initial participatory assessments. 
PROSPECT scaled up from the 3 compounds of PUSH II to 11.  After the initial 
process orientation of PUSH, while maintaining a community-based focus, PROSPECT 
began to revert to a more traditional project arrangement.  PROSPECT￿s proposal, for 
instance, specifically identified water provision and microfinance as interventions. 
Facilitating Factors and Challenges 
 
Although supposedly water supply was to be simply an entry point for more in-
depth work to build up the ABOs and encourage CDD, CARE￿s efforts to follow up on 
this have been less than optimal.  The two principal factors that militated against this 
seem to have been (1) political conflict between the ABOs and the traditional hierarchical 
power structures and (2) the difficulty of structuring organizational incentives to 
encourage consistent long-term actions to support CDD. 
As CDD scales up, political tension is likely.  The spreading of the RDCs 
threatened the authority of the city councilors, who traditionally have been in charge of 
development in the compounds (although not necessarily effectively).  With PROSPECT, 
residents saw the RDCs managing substantial resources and promoting investment 
beneficial to the community.  The RDCs were an emerging threat to the councilors￿ 
status.  In 1999, the council suspended further RDC elections.  To resolve the crisis, 
PROSPECT worked with the city council and ABOs so that everyone understood their 
roles.  Under the auspices of CARE, stakeholders worked to develop a new legal 
framework for RDC and council relations.  Elections only resumed in mid-2002, so for 
almost three years, the ABO structure was not fully operational.  (Some project activities 
continued, as the suspension only affected new elections, but the conflict cast a pall over 
ABO, CARE, and council relations.)  The result of the suspension has been a more robust   iv
legal framework for the ABOs, a significant step forward for scaling up CDD, integration 
of the ABOs into the municipal government structure, and its spread to all peri-urban 
compounds in Lusaka (whether CARE works in them or not). 
Still, the crisis showed how politics can be a significant obstacle to CDD and 
scaling-up if ignored.  The experience suggests politics cannot and should not be avoided.  
Politicians, bureaucrats, and local leaders may perceive new structures and new resources 
as threatening to their traditional positions or governing mechanisms.  However, they 
may also see them as opportunities, and they may want￿and deserve￿some say about 
how resources are allocated or institutions reformed or set up.  If CDD avoids or 
antagonizes these stakeholders, they may undermine the program.  However, if the 
program engages them, they may be able to support it, leverage funds, influence or 
recruit others, or advise of future plans or pitfalls that may affect the project.  Good 
program design that stresses communication and engagement of key players from the 
beginning is crucial. 
CARE￿s position as an important international NGO with resources to fund the 
dialogue and meet some community needs possibly allowed them to play that mediating 
role in a way that a less prestigious or less well-funded organization could not.  Scaling 
up CDD may thus require the prestige and resources of an outside catalytic change agent, 
and it almost certainly requires that stakeholder and participant roles and responsibilities 
are clarified from the beginning and quite possibly ￿officialized￿ in some way. 
The history of PUSH II and PROSPECT also illustrates the organizational 
difficulty of supporting CDD.  Despite PUSH II￿s initial emphasis on CDD and 
empowerment, PROSPECT over time came to focus more on promoting specific 
interventions (water provision, microfinance) than on energizing CDD in a sustainable 
way.  This is not entirely surprising, given the genuine community need for water, 
external evaluations that encouraged water schemes, and donors that stressed outputs 
over process.  As a result, the focus shifted from process to specific activities of 
previously determined project components.  PROSPECT￿s own monitoring and 
evaluation system also focused more on outputs or their impacts, rather than on indicators   v
of effectiveness and sustainability of ABOs.  Efforts to support CDD thus will require 
changes in project design and performance indicators, and in donor perspectives and 
expectations. 
Other factors were also important in shaping CDD.  Democratization and a 
national policy of decentralization, along with encouragement from key CARE staff, 
encouraged a community-based approach to development.  Project management was 
careful to train staff in participatory methods.  This was important for them to understand 
how to promote CDD.  Project and mission management￿s own insistence on 
decentralizing authority and empowering staff further enhanced this thrust.  All this 
created a national and institutional environment important to promoting CDD. 
Funding continues to be a severe challenge to sustainability.  Neither Council nor 
ABOs have adequate resources to build capacity or implement projects to meet identified 
needs.  Without resources to meet community demands, CDD becomes a hollow exercise 
and structures will wither. 
The evolution of PROSPECT suggests that the nature of support to CDD will 
change over time.  The promoting organization therefore must be a learning and 
empowering organization.  Initial promotion of CDD may involve establishing local 
structures and working to create an enabling environment, but supporting organizations 
must move to build their capacity on a number of fronts, including needs identification, 
project design, fund-raising, and project management.  As community, municipal, and 
national structures become stronger, the promoting organization will need to move from 
the center to the side.  It may still be involved in strengthening organizations and shaping 
the enabling environment, but the skills and activities required to do this are very 
different from those required at the beginning, when the institutional landscape is more 
barren.  The promoting organization itself must be ready to transform its support 
(activities, funding focus, and staff numbers and skills) rather than simply ￿shutting 
down￿ or ￿exiting.￿ 
The study also finds that scaling up occurs rather naturally along a number of 
different dimensions over time.  In PROSPECT￿s case, not only were the ABOs   vi
ultimately integrated into the social and institutional fabric of urban government in 
Lusaka, PROSPECT￿s approach had impact beyond the project itself.  Seeing a need for 
project learning and documentation, CARE instituted a new project, Urban INSAKA.  
CARE￿s C3 is a relatively new project that, like the Zambian Social Investment Fund, 
funds community initiatives, thereby supporting CDD with responsive resources.  CULP 
has repeated PROSPECT￿s approach in three more cities in Zambia, while Mahavita has 
transferred the experience to Antananarivo in Madagascar.  These last examples of 
scaling-up depended to a great extent on the international reach of CARE and key 
advisors who took the experiences, structures, approach, and lessons from PROSPECT 
and transferred them to other locations. 
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1.  Introduction 
Since 1998, PROSPECT (Program of Support for Poverty Elimination and 
Community Transformation) has worked to reduce poverty in peri-urban areas of Lusaka.  
PROSPECT uses a community-based approach to carry out three types of activities:  
social empowerment (institution building at the local level), personal empowerment 
(microfinance), and infrastructure improvement (mostly water supply schemes). 
PROSPECT has attempted to carry out these activities largely through its support 
of area-based organizations (ABOs) that now form part of city government.  The zone 
development committees (ZDCs) and residents￿ development committees (RDCs) are the 
basic components of the ABO structure.  They are community-level representations of 
municipal government:  the community￿s mechanisms for expressing its voice and 
driving development. 
PROSPECT is an extension of an earlier project, PUSH II (Peri-Urban Self-Help 
Project).  PUSH II and PROSPECT are fundamentally about developing community-
based and community-driven development (CDD) mechanisms, strengthening 
community capacities to identify and respond to community needs.  This paper examines 
the scaling-up experience of PUSH II and PROSPECT, looking especially at the ABOs. 
The Study 
The study aims to learn about scaling up from PUSH/PROSPECT experience.  
The key questions for this study are 
•  How do you promote scaling-up? 
•  What are the essential elements of success, and the critical challenges? 
This report is not an evaluation of PROSPECT￿s operations or impact; rather, issues of 
effectiveness and sustainability are intimately linked to issues surrounding scaling up.  
This is because 2 
•  We want to scale up something that is effective, 
•  The elements of successful operation and sustainability may influence the ability 
to successfully scale up, and 
•  Scaling-up issues may vary, depending on whether the program itself is effective. 
Consequently, the study provides insights into operational effectiveness and 
sustainability.  From the point of view of the questions above, was PROSPECT a 
successful, sustainable experience with scaling-up?  Or was there just a mechanical 
replication and spreading of structures? 
The independent final evaluation of PROSPECT conducted in early 2003 (Hall et 
al. 2003) is largely positive about PROSPECT￿s impact on a wide range of indicators, 
although it makes three critical observations, which this study supports: 
•  The impact of many initiatives is poorly measured or difficult to measure (and so 
left unconfirmed). 
•  PROSPECT did not have as much impact as it might have. 
•  PROSPECT must be actively strategic for the remainder of the project period to 
sustain its impacts. 
So, understood as a successful intervention, PROSPECT is a worthwhile case 
study.  With PROSPECT apparently successfully redirecting, energizing, and integrating 
community-based organizations (CBOs) into the municipal governance structures of 
Lusaka, it is also a worthwhile study of the challenges faced by initiatives to scale up 
CDD. 
Over a period of about three weeks in May 2003, I conducted interviews with a 
range of focus groups and key informants, and I reviewed proposals, reports, and other 
background documentation.  The experience of PROSPECT is complemented by 
incorporation of additional information from other CARE Zambia projects (CULP, C3, 
Urban Insaka) and from Mahavita, an urban livelihoods program in Madagascar.  
Specifically, I conducted interviews with representatives from ABOs in 8 of the 3 
11 compounds where PROSPECT works, and in 5 areas where PROSPECT does not 
work; senior community development officers on the staff of the Lusaka City Council; 
two area councilors; four field staff (basically the more experienced half of the remaining 
field staff of PROSPECT￿s institution building component), the program manager and 
assistant program manager for PROSPECT; and current and former project coordinators 
of other urban-based CARE programs:  CULP, C3, KAR, and Urban Insaka.  Some of 
these points also build on data collected by Jennifer Rowell, CARE/U.K.￿s urban advisor. 
One reason PROSPECT provides unique lessons is because of its nearly 10-year 
history (when considering it as an extension of PUSH II) of a community-based approach 
to development.  It has gone through a number of phases and thus provides lessons about 
how such programs develop and change over time.  Of greatest interest to this study, 
PROSPECT has gone through the process of ￿redirecting￿ and energizing the ABOs and 
assisting their incorporation into the social and institutional fabric of municipal 
governance.  It is now in the process of phasing out (or scaling down).  PROSPECT 
scales up processes as well as ￿hardware,￿ such as infrastructure. 
Within PROSPECT, the ABOs (zone and resident￿s development committees￿or 
ZDCs and RDCs) are the prime representation of and the major actors in CDD, so the 
study focuses on them.  The ZDCs are closest to the community.  Along with the RDCs, 
they take responsibility for mobilizing residents, implementing projects at the grassroots, 
and listening to and taking community concerns to the RDC level for discussion and 
action.  Community residents elect 10 members (five men and five women) for three-year 
terms.  The RDC is a representative decisionmaking body for each compound that links 
residents with the municipal council.  Generally, the administrative boundaries for the 
RDC and the area councilor are the same.  Each compound thus usually has one 
councilor, although especially large compounds, such as George, may have more than 
one. 
Initially, the ZDCs and the RDCs were linked by a forum of zone representatives 
(FZR), but this was abolished after a political conflict arose between the municipal 
council and the ABOs in 2000 (see Figure 1).  Other elements may have supported or 4 
emerged from these ABOs (for example, water boards are a new facet of community-
based management), but ABOs remain the key element. 





































Source:  Revised from Bopp and Bopp (2001) and Hedley (1999). 
Forum of Zone Representatives (FZR) 
Policymaking body 
Abolished with reforms of 2001. 
Zone Development Committees (ZDC), 
grassroots body for implementation and ABO 
accountability. 
Composed of 10 members (5 men, 5 women), 
elected by community residents. 
Municipal Council. 
Area Councilor (normally 1 
per compound). 
Council Staff 
Residents￿ Development Committee [RDC] 
coordinates development activities compound-wide. 
 
RDC composed of one representative from each zone, 
elected by ZDC; 10￿20 zones per compound 5 
The Meaning and Context of Scaling Up 
In simplified schematic terms, for CDD to be effective, communities must have 
the capacity to carry out development-related activities and make demands on service 
providers, primarily government authorities.  Government must have the willingness and 
capacity to respond.  Effective mechanisms to link community and government must 
operate in a conducive, enabling environment.  In essence, there must be the ability of the 
community to ￿demand￿ development and the government to work to ￿supply￿ it. 
CDD does not mean that the community takes on full responsibility for all 
development activities in the area￿it does not have to provide all human, financial, or 
technical resources.  Nor does it mean that the catalyst for action has to come from the 
community, or that the program itself has to originate there.  It means that the community 
participates meaningfully in￿and fundamentally drives￿the decisions about 
development that affect it.  And this means that the community has the capacity to gain 
access to, build, and profit from the human, financial, and technical resources mentioned 
above. 
Some sort of community organization must exist to drive development, but this 
does not mean that their only form must be as nongovernmental, community-bounded 
associations.  A variety of organizational structures can undertake CDD, including, as in 
this study, organizations that ultimately form part of the local government. 
Scaling up a project beyond the confines of a community requires flexibility and 
ability to adapt to new local conditions (to different local environment).  Scaling-up also 
begins an interaction with the larger environment, one that is not necessary when 
CDD works only within the boundaries of a community.  CDD therefore requires a 
different strategic effort than just repeating a project in another bounded area.  
This paper examines the following:  
•  the context of CDD in Lusaka, 
•  the origins of PROSPECT, 
•  evolution of PROSPECT, including its dimensions of scaling up, 6 
•  the development of ABOs, 
•  factors that have constrained and encouraged PROSPECT￿s scaling up of CDD, 
•  lessons for scaling-up processes of CDD. 
2.  The National Context and Community-Driven Development 
Zambia has experimented with community participation for development in urban 
unplanned settlements since at least the Second National Development Plan in 1972.  At 
that point, the government made a decision to upgrade￿rather than demolish￿squatter 
settlements, which were usually illegal and located in peri-urban areas on the fringes of 
cities.  Early efforts to create infrastructure for basic services in these areas were largely 
unsuccessful.  The city council simply did not have the funds to manage or maintain 
services, and settlement residents had limited participation in planning and managing 
infrastructure.  Consequently, they had little stake in protecting, using, and maintaining 
the services (Hedley 1998). 
These constraints continued to limit provision of urban services until Zambia￿s 
return to multiparty democracy in 1991.  With democratization came an emphasis on 
greater participation and on decentralization of planning and decisionmaking.  This 
required strengthening local government and fostering a more enabling environment for 
CDD. 
As part of these initiatives, in 1992, the Lusaka City Council (LCC) passed a 
resolution calling for the establishment of a CBO in low-income settlements to spearhead 
development.  Only in 1994 did the LCC formally order the establishment of RDCs in all 
peri-urban settlements, or compounds, of Lusaka.  The RDCs replaced the previous ward 
development committees that had been established during the Second Republic (1972￿
91).  The ward development committees represented very large areas (sometimes four or 
five settlements), functioned primarily as extensions of the ruling political party, and 
tended to work without close consultation with either the LCC or local residents.  The 7 
RDCs would serve as the new compound-wide mechanism for community participation 
in planning and development (Hedley 1998). 
In an interesting play of factors, the drive for decentralization and participation 
threw light on the situation of illegal peri-urban settlements.  Seen initially as temporary, 
government had largely ignored them.  Years later, they were still there and clearly were 
not going to disappear.  But how to provide them with services when they had no legal 
standing or representation in urban government?  The municipal government began to 
legalize these areas and allow the establishment of an RDC and representation in city 
government through an area councilor.  The problem of lack of resources, however, 
persisted, and city government remained largely unable to provide services. 
The opening of the political system to democratic competition during the Third 
Republic (1991 to present) was a positive development, but the transition to genuine 
political competition and accountability was not immediate and remains incomplete.  The 
competencies of community, municipal, and national authorities are still being worked 
out.  The broad outlines of the national government￿s decentralization policy has been 
known for almost 10 years, but the policy paper was published only recently.  In the 
meantime, policies generally recognized the government￿s inability to pay for services 
and supported the concept of CBOs playing implementation and even limited policy roles 
(Hedley 1999, GKCr).
1 
The national government has set up decisionmaking bodies, the Development 
Coordinating Committees, to coordinate programs and policies at the national, provincial, 
and district level (Lusaka is one district), but they remain largely inactive (Hedley 1999, 
GKCr, RC).  The Ministry of Health has developed district health boards and established 
neighborhood health committees.  Donors have worked with various levels of 
government to support decentralization, including a UNCHS/Danida-funded training 
program of the Ministry of Local Government, the Sustainable Lusaka Program that 
                                                 
1 Interviews with focus groups and key informants are referenced by letters.  GKCr, for example, is for the 
joint session held with RDC members (r) from George, Kanyama, and Chipata compounds (GKC).  See the 
Annex for more detail. 8 
operated with UNEP/UNCHS support, and Irish Aid￿s Program of Community Managed 
Urban Services (Hedley 1999). 
The national government still exerts a great deal of control over municipal actions 
and has sometimes thwarted efforts at decentralization and democratization.  For 
instance, the Third Republic introduced elections of city councilors.  Councilors then 
were to select a mayor or town clerk.  As of 1999, however, the LCC still had limited 
powers and responded largely to and relied on resources from the Ministry of Local 
Government and Housing.  The ministry even suspended the council and clerk and 
appointed a Local Government Administrator for Lusaka for almost two years (Hedley 
1999). 
3.  CARE￿s Involvement 
PUSH I 
The economic recovery strategy initiated in 1989 aimed to stabilize and 
restructure the economy.  By removing subsidies and price controls on basic 
commodities, including the staple maize meal, prices rose, increasing the hardship of the 
urban poor.  At the same time, conditions in the squatter settlements, or compounds, were 
worsening, with accumulation of garbage, blocked or nonexistent drainage systems, 
distant or contaminated water sources, and few latrines (Alston et al. 1993). 
PUSH (1991￿94) was a food-for-work (FFW) program that began as an initiative 
of the Program Against Malnutrition (PAM).  PAM was a Government of Zambia and a 
World Food Programme (WFP) effort intended to alleviate the negative effects of 
structural adjustment and stabilization and the 1991￿92 drought on well-being and food 
security (DfID 1998). 
PUSH was a ￿quick action￿ program that targeted the urban food-insecure; the 
idea was that relief would reduce the likelihood of urban unrest (DfID 1998).  At WFP￿s 
request, CARE implemented PUSH in three of the largest of Lusaka￿s then-33 
compounds:  Chipata (about 120,000 residents), George (about 150,000), and Kanyama 9 
(50,000￿100,000).  WFP would be the lead donor, providing US$1.5 million in 
foodstuffs, while the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) agreed to 
provide C$1.5 million for Canadian and local costs.  In these compounds, PUSH 
benefited 2,000 participants, mainly women, who contributed labor to building roads and 
drainage systems and clearing garbage (CARE/Zambia, no date[a]). 
Phase I of PUSH was clearly driven from the top.  It was, after all, a response to 
economic crisis, with the nature of assistance largely mapped out by donors and the 
national government.  PUSH I was not intended to be a community-development project.  
As it evolved, however, CARE found itself responding to a wider range of needs than 
initially envisioned.  For instance, 95 percent of the workers in Lusaka were women.  
Responding to worker demand and need, CARE helped establish preschools (Alston et al. 
1993). 
The expansion of project activities beyond FFW led CARE into greater 
community involvement and, by implication, into community development.  CARE 
wanted a community-based partner and began to work with the LCC to support the 
creation or reestablishment of RDCs in the compounds where it operated.  These early 
RDCs were often formed through the participation of a limited number of local residents.  
By 1995, the need for broader-based participation was apparent, and the ABO structure 
was further elaborated.  The idea of zone representatives, as units beneath the RDC, was 
being pioneered in Kamanga compound under an Irish Aid upgrading project (Hedley 
1998) and had already been suggested by an ODA review team. 
PUSH II 
In the second phase of PUSH, PUSH II (1994￿97), CARE sought to move from 
direct implementation to facilitating implementation and building the capacity of the 
community to identify and act on development needs (CARE Zambia, no date [a]).  
Despite the name, it was hardly a second phase:  it worked in the same three compounds 10 
(Chipata, George, and Kanyama) but otherwise was very different.  It turned out to be, in 
fact, the direct precursor and pilot of PROSPECT. 
PUSH II phased out the FFW program and structured activities around the three 
concepts and activity sets mentioned earlier:  social empowerment (ABOs), personal 
empowerment (microfinance), and infrastructure improvement (water supply).  
Empowerment of beneficiaries and communities to drive development was PUSH II￿s 
guiding principle. 
PUSH II established an ABO structure in each compound with three levels:  the 
zone development committees (ZDCs), a forum of zone representatives (FZR), and a 
residents￿ development committee (RDC).  The FZR was to facilitate exchange and 
debate between the ZDC and the RDC on zonal issues.  The RDC was to provide 
compound-wide coordination and deal with development issues or take them up with the 
city council.  PUSH II trained these area-based representatives in leadership skills, 
community mobilization, and project management. 
PROSPECT 
PROSPECT (1998￿2004) scaled up PUSH II from these 3 compounds to 11 in 
Lusaka, raising the number of beneficiary residents to about 600,000.  PROSPECT 
essentially maintained PUSH II￿s focus and approach, only without FFW.  Over time, 
PROSPECT continued learning and refining its components.  It increased the size of the 
microfinance group, originally an average of 4￿5 members, so that each individual could 
obtain a greater amount of self-raised capital.  It encouraged the formation of a 
cooperative among the groups.  A water trust incorporating service providers and 
community representatives was established to ensure effective, sustainable water 
management.  The water payment system was refined to allow individuals to ￿pay as they 
go.￿  Environmental health emerged as a significant new activity, as did work on 
HIV/AIDS and gender.  And after a serious political conflict between the RDCs and the 11 
city council, the FZR was eliminated, resulting in a two-tier ABO composed of only 
ZDCs and an RDC in each compound. 
4.  Development of the Area-Based Organizations (ABOs) 
The ABOs are supposed to be the voice of the community￿the structures driving 
community development.  As such, they merit special attention and are the focus of this 
paper in terms of learning lessons about scaling-up.  As noted, the RDCs emerged from 
existing political structures, either as reformulations of the ward development committees 
or as new structures established by the city council. 
In 1994, LCC and PUSH I formed a steering committee to draft a constitution for 
the RDCs.  The original mandate of the RDCs was inclusive.  RDCs were to act to 
•  improve market facilities, roads, drainage, water, sanitation, and garbage; 
•  improve shelter, recreation amenities, public health, and education; 
•  promote economic and cultural activities and other developments; 
•  manage human and financial resources as necessary to develop community plans; 
•  ensure that women and men of all levels could receive leadership and business 
training; 
•  engage residents to express their needs and effectively implement, monitor, 
evaluate, and maintain committee projects; 
•  promote communication about needs and potential means of meeting them among 
local residents and outside authorities and agents; 
•  coordinate the work of these residents and agents; 
•  promote relevant research; 
•  provide information and advisory services to committee members as needed; and 
•  further the objectives of the committee. 
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RDC members were elected for three-year terms.  All settlement residents age 18 
and older could vote.  No one who held office in a political party was eligible to run.  The 
city council had the RDCs register in the Registrar of Societies, essentially a CBO, not a 
government body, in order to reinforce their nonpartisan nature and to allow them to own 
and manage assets, such as property and services. 
The area councilor served as an ex-officio member of the RDC, but the 
constitution did not otherwise spell out the relationship between the RDC and councilor 
or the City Council.  It only stated that the councilor was the primary channel of 
communication with the City Council, and that, otherwise, the RDC should communicate 
with the municipality￿s Peri-Urban Section of the Housing and Social Services 
Department. 
Importantly, as shown by its initial dealings with the LCC under PUSH I, CARE 
seems to have recognized the importance of getting government acquiescence to the 
establishment of these structures, but then it largely worked with them at the margin of 
government.  They were seen primarily as a community-based structure, a CBO, with 
which CARE could engage and implement project activities, particularly water and 
finance, not as part of government.  As such, they appear to have existed fairly 
autonomously from other CBOs or NGOs in the community.  At the same time, they 
were set up with close ties with the municipal government and essentially stated they had 
responsibility over (not just an interest in) practically all aspects of community 
development. 
When an RDC￿s term of office ended, the city council could appoint trustees to 
serve as caretakers until a new RDC could be elected.  This would allow development to 
proceed without interruption while new elections were being organized.  The original 
ABO system did not anticipate this feature, but it would play a major role during the 
crisis. 
In 2002 and 2003, PROSPECT assisted with ABO reelections under the revised 
ABO constitution and model.  It has formed and trained 4,400 ABO members and 60 13 
community facilitators.  Ten of these are now facilitators themselves.  It is piloting 
compound-wide coordination mechanisms in four compounds (Chimansa 2003). 
5.  Project Evolution and Community-Driven Development 
The Shift to Community-Driven Development 
PUSH I was a traditional top-down development project, but the focus of PUSH II 
shifted to empowerment and CDD.  Working within a national environment that was 
encouraging democracy and decentralization, two other factors contributed to this shift:  
an ODA appraisal and the training and philosophy of key CARE staff. 
As the PUSH project came to an end, CARE began searching for funds to 
continue.  CIDA, the Canadian development agency that had funded PUSH, had made a 
decision not to fund projects in Lusaka any more.  In response, CARE requested funds 
for a project extension from ODA, and in September 1993, an ODA appraisal team came 
to Zambia to evaluate CARE￿s proposal. 
This mission set the future direction for PUSH and PROSPECT.  The mission 
emphasized that the FFW scheme was not an effective safety net for urban residents for a 
number of reasons:  it had only reached a small proportion of the needy population; it was 
not targeted to those at highest risk of malnutrition; and it made no contribution to the 
long-term capacity of participants to improve their livelihoods or the ability of the 
community to sustain the improved infrastructure and services (Alston et al. 1993). 
The mission then suggested that the project ￿extension￿ should shift from FFW to 
community development.  It emphasized developing capacities of community residents 
and leaders and consistently noted the need for community participation in the design and 
implementation of the carry-on project.  Of signature importance was the fact that the 
mission did not specify which activities the project extension should undertake.  In fact, 
the mission explicitly stated that the determination of project activities should mostly take 
place only after funding was secured and after completing a baseline and other initial 
studies.  This now-community development project would be, in ODA terminology the 14 
report said, a ￿process project￿:  it would determine priorities and outputs only after the 
project began (Alston et al. 1993).  This was the basis for genuine CDD under PUSH II, 
and in its focus on process and community participation, it reflected the latest in 
development thinking at the time (DfID 1998). 
The mission also noted that the community had to have a truly representative 
mechanism for the community to express itself, if the project was to genuinely reflect 
community needs and allow for community participation and control.  At the time, only a 
few years after the beginning of a multi-party system in Zambia, the RDCs were not 
accountable to the people, nor did they serve as an effective channel of communication 
between community and government.  The RDCs were to be nonpolitical but in practice, 
with the phase-out of the ward development committees, they continued to function 
largely as party structures [CCJr, CCJz, Npr].  They had lost their clout and public 
support.  In many compounds, even those in which CARE was working, there were no 
elections.  RDC members were volunteers, frequently known community leaders, chosen 
after meetings of just 10 to 30 people often from within only a small area of the 
compound (DfID 1998) [Cdos]. 
To address these problems, the report suggested the establishment of development 
committees at a lower level, the zone.  These two committees, the ZDCs and the RDCs, 
would form the basis for the ABOs that would be the cornerstone of CARE￿s efforts to 
promote CDD. 
The ODA mission also probably helped CARE avoid some pitfalls of scaling-up.  
CARE￿s initial intention was to expand PUSH I to nine compounds.  But the mission 
argued that PUSH I was not a pilot for PUSH II, and did not provide the necessary 
operational experiences to learn for PUSH II.  PUSH II was different.  The report said 
CARE should learn about conditions and processes before expanding, that CARE should 
continue to work in the same compounds as it had during PUSH I and truly pilot the new 
focus.  The report also highlighted the importance of trained staff for a process project.  
PUSH II would require a different composition of staff, with different skills (fewer 15 
engineers, more social development workers, for instance) (Alston et al. 1993).  CARE 
took both of these recommendations on board. 
CARE itself was also moving to a more participatory approach.  CARE￿s country 
and assistant country directors pushed for more CDD and provided a supportive 
environment for ODA￿s recommendations.  As a relatively new country office, 
established only in 1991, it was looking for ways to make CARE unique and appealing to 
donors.  After internal consultations, CARE decided that a principal distinguishing 
feature would be not what they did, but how they did things.  They decided to focus on 
partnerships with stakeholders.  Instead of being top-down or confrontational, they would 
engage the communities and the government, building on and sharing experiences with 
decisionmakers and actors.  In a fairly small office, management worked to create a team 
spirit and an appreciation for organizational learning.  Project staff interacted with 
country management easily and often [RC]. 
The backgrounds and interest of key CARE staff also influenced the focus on 
participation and CDD.  The Assistant Country Director who led the PUSH II redesign 
was a sociologist who had worked previously in rural areas of Zambia.  Trained in the 
U.K., he was well aware of the new thinking at Sussex and elsewhere about participatory 
development and a more holistic approach to poverty through understanding livelihood 
strategies.  ODA￿s recommendations reinforced his own push for community 
participation and community-based development within CARE [RC, MD]. 
In the end, PUSH II challenged conventional thinking about project design, which 
tended to have specific, pre-determined components, inputs and anticipated outcomes.  
PUSH II emphasized learning along with the community.  This approach was particularly 
appropriate, given the heterogeneity and complexity of urban needs and conditions, and 
of CARE￿s lack of knowledge about urban conditions and of urban project experience 
(DfID 1998).  That in practice PUSH and PROSPECT largely fell back to promoting 
specific interventions such as water supply is a testimony to the difficulties in 
implementing and sustaining such an approach.  Nevertheless, the experience does 
provide some insights into structures and capacities needed to support such an approach. 16 
Carrying Out Community-Driven Development 
CARE￿s approach to CDD involved enabling the community to identify and 
respond to needs.  Community empowerment started when CARE entered the 
community, as PUSH II and PROSPECT incorporated community residents into the 
initial rapid needs and institutional assessment.  The two introductory steps integrated a 
rapid needs appraisal with the formation or re-energizing of the ABOs (CARE Zambia, 
no date [b]; Barton et al. 1997). 
•  Part 1￿Surveillance and Rapid Appraisal￿established an implementation team, 
including city council staff and the area Councilor, to undertake initial studies.  
The team introduced the project to compound leaders, such as the RDC members 
if already established, businesspeople, and church leaders; did a rapid assessment 
of institutions operating in the area; and demarcated administrative zones within 
the compound. 
•  Part 2￿PANA II and ABO Formation￿included a more in-depth assessment of 
the problems, capacities, and opportunities for change in the community.  With 
local community leaders and residents, CARE led a PANA, or Participatory 
Appraisal and Needs Assessment, at the zone level.  This more thorough 
assessment reconfirmed and deepened the analysis of the issues uncovered in the 
rapid appraisal, and identified any area-specific issues.  The team sponsored the 
election of a zone development committee and was supposed to formulate an 
action plan to respond to the identified community needs. 
PANAs in the three compounds of Chipata, George, and Kanyama confirmed that 
water was a serious need in all areas.  CARE recognized that to be sustainable, the water 
supply would need a community-based management structure and it would need to 
generate sufficient revenues to cover costs.  The poorest would need to be able to earn 
enough income to pay for the water.  In this way, the three components of PUSH II came 
together:  Institution Building (IB), which focused on establishing effective, functioning 17 
ABOs; Infrastructure Improvement (II), which helped construct a water system, including 
tap stands; and Microfinance (MF), primarily for women, which established self-
managed savings and loans groups based on the traditional savings system, chilimba. 
PUSH II intended to carry out these activities sequentially.  To ensure community 
ownership and input, the IB component would begin first.  Staff would make initial 
contacts, demarcate zones, hold elections if necessary, and then conduct the PANA.  The 
process took time and had to be repeated in every zone.  With 10 to 20 zones, this could 
take months, and the communities who had completed the process became impatient.  On 
the other hand, construction firms were contracted on a certain time schedule and were 
ready to work, regardless of whether the ABO was fully formed or not [Prs].  In practice, 
the II often began before the ABO and the PANA were complete.  Staff say this is 
because the IB component was inherently political and also relied more on developing 
community relations [Prs]. 
PUSH focused initial attention on developing the ABOs.  By building on existing 
structures, CARE enhanced sustainability (the structures already responded to some 
expressed need and were part of the community and municipal structure), but they also 
encountered distortions.  For example, although the RDCs were supposed to be 
representative and apolitical, previous members of the RDC with political affiliations 
were allowed to run for office again.  Conflict sometimes emerged when the demarcation 
lines threw more than one set of members of the RDCs into electoral competition [Prs]. 
6.  Building and Scaling Up Processes and Institutions 
PUSH II scaled up as PROSPECT.  The idea was to continue work in the three 
initial compounds and expand to nine more over five years.  By 2003, then, PROSPECT 
should have been working in 12 of the 39 peri-urban compounds in Lusaka.  The 
composition and number changed over time, as circumstances changed in the compounds 
or compounds were not legalized, excluding them from consideration. 18 
PROSPECT had begun work in three additional compounds by 2000:  Jack 
(1998), Chaisa (1999), and Chibolya (2000).  But then, as a result of a political dispute, 
the city council suspended further RDC elections.  Although some activities continued to 
go forward, the election and redirection of the ABOs￿the scaling-up that is the focus of 
this paper￿stopped.  The stakeholders, including CARE, the city council, and the RDCs, 
reached a resolution in 2002, and elections began again.  PROSPECT now works in five 
other compounds (Chuunga, Kabanana, Chazanga, Mtendere, and Garden), bringing the 
total number of ￿expansion compounds￿ to eight.  Some of these held elections only in 
2004.  This experience highlights the challenges of scaling up CDD. 
Dimensions of Scaling-Up 
Activities that increase a program￿s impact are not by themselves scaling-up; a 
dimension of growth or progression must accompany change and transformation.  PUSH 
II/PROSPECT scaled up along multiple dimensions (see Table 1).  The experience 
suggests that such transformations are organic aspects of programs that promote CDD. 
PROSPECT scaled up ￿internally,￿ that is, in ways that relate specifically project 
operations, by 
•  entering new compounds, 
•  incorporating new activities, 
•  working beyond the RDC down to the zone level and up to the level of the city 
council and the national government, and 
•  building managerial and community capacity to undertake activities. 
PROSEPCT scaled up ￿externally￿ that is, in ways that affected the operations of 
other programs and organizations, by 
•  seeing the city council establish and support ABOs in other compounds where 
PROSPECT did not work, 19 
•  integrating the ABO structure into municipal governance, 
•  influencing national and city council policy (sitting on committees, etc.), and 
•  catalyzing other efforts, as offshoots or support for PROSPECT (Urban Insaka, 
C3) or separate projects (CULP in other Zambian cities, Mahavita in 
Antananarivo, Madagascar). 
Thus, PROSPECT represented a scaling-up of PUSH II quantitatively, 
functionally, organizationally, and politically (Table 1).  Most important for this study, 
PROSPECT is an instance where a donor (DfID) and an operational organization 
(CARE) scaled up CDD in ways that it became integrated into national and municipal 
structures.  This has then allowed for widespread ￿replication￿ of CDD. 
The Impact of Scaling-Up 
PROSPECT may have scaled up, but has it scaled up successfully?  A recent 
review (Hall et al. 2003) says yes.  The review argues that the ABOs in compounds 
where PROSPECT has worked are, in general, better able to articulate the interests of 
residents.  Partly this is a result of PROPECT staff￿s conducting (usually one-off) 
trainings in governance, leadership, and management. 
PROSPECT is, within limits noted earlier, an illustration of successful scaling-up 
in that government has incorporated and spread structures of CDD.  In its lifetime, 
PROSPECT has influenced the thinking and actions of government and civil society 
organizations and of international donor agencies and organizations.  Public authorities 
are more aware of the needs and potentials of poor urban residents.  The city council now 
formally recognizes the ABOs and has adopted the ABO structure as part of city 
government, spreading them to another 24 or so compounds outside PROSPECT areas.  
Many councilors actively support the idea of the ABOs, and council staff works to 
strengthen them as well, to the extent possible, given limited resources.  Many ABOs 
have established working relationships with other agencies and international donors, such  20 
Table 1: Dimensions of PUSH/PROSPECT￿s scaling-up 
Quantitative scaling-up (or scaling-out) PUSH/PROSPECT 
Spread  Increasing numbers of people spontaneously 
adhering to the organization and its programs, 
perceiving them to serve their interest/preferences 
   ABOs established with new structure in 36 of 39 
peri-urban compounds 
   expansion of activities of ABOs in their own 
compounds 
Replication A  successful  program (methodology and 
organizational mode) is repeated elsewhere. 
   ABOs redirected in three compounds and now 
replicated in eight8 more 
Nurture  A well-staffed and well-funded outside agency, 
using a specific incentive-based methodology, 
nurtures local initiatives on an increasingly large 
scale. 
   Directs ABOs to funding sources, including C3 and 
ZAMSIF  
 
Integration  A program is integrated into existing structures 
and systems and, in particular, government 
structures after it has demonstrated its potential. 
   LCC supports establishment of ABOs with new 
constitution, replication in peri-urban areas, use of 
council staff  
Functional scaling-up   
Horizontal  Unrelated new activities are added to existing 
programs, or new programs are undertaken by the 
same organization. 
   Environmental health, gender, and HIV/ AIDS 
components added 
   PROSPECT links with KAR (urban waste 
management program) to mobilize communities 
   ABOs constructed clinics and police posts and 
community centers 
Vertical  Other activities related to the same chain of 
activities as the original one are added to an 
existing program (i.e., upward or downward 
linkages are made). 
   enhancing government verticalities 
   planning to focus on ZDC capacity 
   suggesting creation of federation of ABOs 
   creating capacity and support among council staff 
and councilors sitting on national development 
coordinating committee (NDCC) 
Political scaling-up   
First generation  Essentially service delivery     PUSH I (FFW to build infrastructure) 
Second generation  Community capacity development for self-reliant 
action; through better information and 
mobilization, an organization￿s members or local 
communities are stimulated to participate in the 
body politic. 
   PUSH II/PROSPECT 
   redirection of ABOs 
   water management 
 
Third  Beyond the community, influence policy reform 
to foster an enabling environment; this may 
involve networking and aggregation of 
organizations into federative structures designed 
to influence policy. 
   PROSPECT 
   governance (Bopp) study and reforms  
   member of NDCC 
   intimately linked with council 
   promotion of federated ABO  
Fourth  Beyond specific policies, catalyze social 
movements, and/or direct entry of grassroots 
organizations, or their leaders, into politics. 
   PROSPECT 
   ABOs legal change from civil society to government 
structure 
   some RDC members have become councilors  
Organizational scaling-up   
Internal management  Increasing organizational capacity and improved 
management processes (links to effectiveness and 
efficiency) 
   cross-training and cross-sectoral coordination of 
CARE staff  
   training of ABOs and LCC members, council staff  
Financial viability  Increasing financial viability/autonomy, including 
self-financing, through subcontracting, 
consultancy or fees-for-service 
   connecting ABOs to water schemes for revenue 
   assisting with finding donors, writing proposals  
Institutional 
diversification 
Both internally and externally (including 
diversification of donors) and linkages with other 
actors/organizations 
   spin-offs and incorporation of RDC in other 
structures (water scheme board, microfinance board) 
   external influence, with LCC, international 
presentations, Mahavita 
   internal influence, with UI, CULP, C3, KAR  
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as Ireland Aid and the Zambian Social Investment Fund (ZAMSIF), to raise funds and 
implement development projects to benefit the wider community (Hall et al. 2003).  Staff 
sit on national and municipal policymaking committees. 
7.  Challenges to Scaling-Up:  Facilitating and Constraining Factors 
But, according to the review, PROSPECT￿s influence and impact have been more 
limited than expected.  The key challenges to successful, sustainable scaling-up seem to 
have been political and organizational.  The spread of the RDCs threatened the authority 
of the city councilors, and in 1999, they moved to suspend further RDC elections.  The 
lifting of the suspension resulted in a more robust legal framework for the ABOs, but the 
crisis created a significant obstacle to scaling up CDD.  Additionally, the history of 
PUSH II and PROSPECT illustrates the organizational difficulty of supporting CDD.  
Despite PUSH II￿s initial emphasis on CDD and empowerment, PROSPECT came to 
focus more on promoting specific interventions (water provision, microfinance) than on 
strengthening ABOs and energizing their relations with the LCC and the national 
government in a sustainable way. 
Other factors include 
•  availability of resources; 
•  capacities of the facilitating, implementing, and monitoring organizations; 
•  institutional arrangements and political complications; and 
•  performance monitoring and incentive systems. 
This study does not intend to repeat information on operations or impact readily 
available in internal and external reviews and reports, but it discusses this information, in 
addition to newly collected data, from the point of view of scaling-up. 22 
Political Challenges 
During the late 1990s, some councilors felt the ABOs were undermining their 
authority and status and compromising the democratic process (Hall et al. 2003).  This 
mistrust had to do with historical, institutional, and financial factors.  Traditionally, the 
councilor was in charge of development activities in each settlement.  Historically, the 
institutional precedent for the RDC was the ward development committee, a politicized 
body that often functioned at the behest of the councilor.  ￿[They] were trying to solve 
some of the problems of the settlements,￿ said one RDC member [CCJr], ￿but they were 
heavily politicized, because the council was being partisan and looked after only their 
own problems.  And community problems were not attended to.  And if there was money 
coming in, they were the only ones who knew, the cadres.￿ 
However, the ABOs that replaced them were different.  Now the ABOs, 
nonpartisan bodies, were charged with promoting and coordinating development in the 
community.  The councilor was not even given a meaningful vote on the RDC, but served 
ex officio.  This was immediately at odds with usual government structures.  Councilors 
had experience mostly with party and national government structures, which functioned 
in a top-down way, and councilors did not understand very well how these structures 
were supposed to work. 
While, potentially, the ABOs could continue to function as extensions of the 
political party (in some cases they did), as key players in PUSH II and PROSPECT, the 
RDCs also managed significant development resources.  Because the RDCs helped to 
mobilize, design, and implement water and microfinance projects, RDC members became 
common faces in the community.  Community residents, long wary of the ineffectiveness 
and bias of the councilors, now saw the concrete fruits of their labors (labor on projects 
was voluntary), and they could see how the RDC benefited the community.  ABOs were 
rivaling and sometimes eclipsing councilors in influence and access to donors (Hall et al. 
2003) [CCJr]. 23 
Conflict arose between councilors and the RDCs as councilors began to see them 
as a threat to their traditional position.  Unfortunately, the ABO constitution did not 
clearly spell out the relationship between councilor and the RDC in a way that could 
resolve the issue.  In addition, RDCs were registered under the Societies Act, giving them 
status as a CBO.  Effectively, however, they were serving as a part of government, but 
without legal authority. 
Said one RDC chairman: 
We had all the support we needed from the council officials, but not from 
the councilor.  From 1991, the MMD [Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy party] came into power.  They were the majority.  Now with 
the coming of the RDC concept, to them it was like we were in opposition 
to them because we were working with NGOs directly, our projects were 
funded directly, and they were successful projects.  Whereas with the 
council, there was no money.  Their programs could not proceed.  And so 
they now saw us as a challenge to the ruling party.  And now they had 
problems with the council officials, accusing them of siding with the 
RDCs more instead of with the councilors.  And this led to the suspension 
of the constitution, because the councilors wanted to form a part, and have 
a say, and name their own cadres.  Now with the coming of the opposition, 
the last elections [2001], there is no MMD in Lusaka.  And we have 
teamed up with the opposition very well.  So the problem was not with the 
council officials, but with the councilors [CCJr]. 
The situation came to a head in late 1999, when the council voted to suspend 
further elections of RDCs (Hall et al. 2003).  CARE was taken aback by this development 
but began to work with major stakeholders and Urban INSAKA to find a solution.  An 
outside team of consultants with expertise in municipal governance, commissioned by 
CARE, undertook a month-long participatory review.  They formed study teams of most 
stakeholders, including RDC members, councilors, PROSPECT, and other CARE staff.  
They gathered and discussed a wide range of perspectives on the council-ABO 
relationship and on the ABO￿s status as an entity of civil society or of government (Hall 
et al. 2003; Bopp and Bopp 2001) [RC]. 24 
The suspension of new elections lasted almost three years.  New elections were 
held in late 2002 and 2003.  This action did not bring all ABO activity to a halt.  In the 
compounds that already had RDCs, for instance, activities kept going as normal because 
no new elections were called during the period [CCJr; CCJz].  PROSPECT continued to 
work in these initial compounds, but could not expand its work on ABOs beyond them.  
This episode showed the political sensitivity of CDD and cast serious doubt on the 
wisdom of PROSPECT￿s approach, which until then had largely tried to avoid 
involvement with government. 
The internal structure within the ABO was also a source of problems.  The FZR 
was to connect the ZDC and the RDC.  But it met infrequently and, according to 
residents, did not filter problems down to the ZDC.  As a result, the ZDC became 
increasingly ineffective.  The grassroots ￿eyes and ears￿ quit seeing and hearing [CCJr]. 
Changes instituted after the consultation clarified the relationships.  It was agreed 
that 
•  ABOs were voluntary nonpartisan development agencies established by the LCC. 
•  ABOs were part of the local government system and should be registered under 
the Local Government Act, not the Societies Act. 
•  The Council would delegate authority to the ABOs, and the ABOs would work in 
partnership with the Council. 
•  The Council would not interfere with the operation of the ABOs, but could 
intervene according to certain guidelines if the ABOs did not follow clearly 
defined rules. 
•  ABOs would have a two-tiered structure with 10 members elected to each ZDC 
(five men and five women).  ZDC representatives would elect one representative 
to the RDC. 
•  ZDCs should meet with residents every quarter; RDCs, twice a year.  The RDC 
should make five-year community development plans, as well as annual working 
plans in consultation with councilors, residents, and other actors. 25 
The most significant changes were the legal incorporation of the ABOs into the 
local government structure; the restructuring of the ABO with the elimination of the FZR; 
and clarification of roles and the education of stakeholders about rights and 
responsibilities. 
Change in Legal Status 
Becoming an official part of the local government has advantages and 
disadvantages.  Although the Societies Act did not give councilors any formal control 
over the RDCs, the history of the institution and the councilors￿ positions as ex officio 
members meant that councilors often tried to exert control.  As one RDC member 
described it, 
The RDC was previously registered under the Societies Act.  The previous 
government wanted to dissolve the RDC, and we were protected, a 
safeguard, they had no power.  All they were interested [in was] to 
dissolve the RDC.  They dissolved only one or two, only to be warned by 
council officials that they had no power [CCJr]. 
But this arrangement was confusing, with councilors as members of the RDC, and 
ABOs in charge of coordinating community development without any statutory authority.  
The ￿protection￿ was legal but minimal.  With no official connection to local 
government, but with independent sources of funds and ￿responsibility￿ for community 
development, the RDCs were emerging as potential threats to the councilors￿ position. 
Paradoxically, by making the ABOs the lowest tier of local government, most 
members feel the position and authority is much clearer and more secure.  The 
institutionalization of the ABOs as part of government provides them with a stability, 
continuity, and authority not possible as a CBO.  Councilors now understand that the 
RDCs are legitimate organs of government that they must work with, they are legal 
structures￿not just ￿clubs,￿ and they are not going away [GKCr].  ￿So whatever we are 
doing, we have the blessing of the LCC.  So we are a small government at a very low 
level￿ [CCJr].  ￿Even if the opposition is a bit here and there, 99 percent of them have 26 
accepted￿ the RDC concept, said one RDC chairperson￿ [CCJr].  Coordination and 
communication have improved.  ￿It is a good thing [to be registered under the Local 
Government Act] because now the RDC is talking directly to the government, the LCC, 
[and] the local government, about the problems￿ [CCJr]. 
Legally, they have had to give up their rights to assets provided by projects, which 
they were entitled to as CBOs.  They felt the fact that the assets now belonged to ￿the 
government,￿ meaning the LCC, rather than to the RDC.  They felt that this was not a 
hindrance but assisted continuity.  ￿The assets will now be protected by the government,￿ 
they said, and, besides, ￿These buildings are ours￿ [CCJr].  So the arrangement seems to 
be working well, with local authorities exerting de facto control and use over the assets 
just as they should as part of local government. 
Some members note, however, the frailty of the arrangements:  ￿When we were 
there under the Societies Act, we had enough protection.  At that time, the councilor 
could not come and dissolve the RDC.  Now under the local government, the councilor 
can wake up and say this dissolve this￿ [CCJz].  The suspension of RDCs elections belies 
his argument, but technically the LCC could still act to eliminate the RDCs.  Most do not 
feel that this will happen, and urge the formation of a federation to strengthen the ABO 
even more so ￿we we￿ll have one voice￿ [CCJr]. 
￿We intend to form a federated body of all the RDCs.  The whole idea is we want 
our voice to be a big one, so we can even lobby for development￿ [CCJr].  Members 
claim that the RDCs know their position and rights, and are prepared to go to court to 
fend off any attempts to dissolve them.  ￿As we are today, if we happened to have a new 
crop of councilors who are arrogant, they could easily push us out.  But if we have a 
federation, then it will become firm and a hard thing for them to break.  The big 
federation will take the cases to court and will have representation, and for them to target 
all 33 compounds, it will be very difficult￿ [CCJr]. 27 
Understanding of Reforms and Roles 
The roles of the ZDC and the RDC are now quite clear to most members.  Even at 
the ZDC level, most could recite the roles and responsibilities of each:  
•  ￿The ZDC is to look at the projects at the zone level, and then whatever problem 
they want, they forward to the RDC and the RDC should go further to look for 
donors￿ [CCJz]. 
•  ￿The RDC is the mother body.￿  ￿The RDCs receive problems from the 
community.  The RDC informs the council at the same time it begins to look for 
funds￿ [GKCr]. 
•  ￿The ZDC is between the RDC.  It takes messages from the RDC to the residents 
and again it picks information.  [For example] maybe the community, the 
residents, see a need of a project which needs to be done￿maybe a bridge, a 
school.  The residents will take the message to the ZDC and will report to the 
RDC￿ [GKCz]. 
With the elimination of the FZR, communications between the ZDC and the RDC 
have improved.  Because ZDCs select an individual from among themselves to serve on 
the RDC, they feel they are well informed.  One group reported no problems or conflicts, 
even when pressed [GKCz], and members of the other focus group said: 
•  ￿Even though I am not on the RDC, I feel like I am there because all my needs are 
heard in the RDC.  They do respond if you have [conflicts].  They do come in and 
give advice to the ZDC￿ [CCJz]. 
•  ￿The relationship between the RDC and the ZDC is very cordial.  Members who 
are on the RDC have been elected from the ZDC so the problems [are discussed]￿ 
[CCJz]. 28 
Some members seemed perturbed by questions about how well the ZDC and RDC 
worked together, and whether the structure actually allowed demands to bubble up from 
the community and the ZDC.  Summarizing, the respondent said:  ￿Don￿t separate them.  
Only the name separates them.  In the actual fact, when they go back in the evening, they 
are the ZDC￿ [CCJz]. 
Politics, Participation, and a Deepening of Democracy 
Politics, of course, still plays a part, but the new structure brings continuity and 
stability and gives more effective voice to the grassroots.  There is greater perspective 
and understanding of roles and responsibilities.  Focus group participants and key 
informants attribute this to the ABO consultation, and continuing education to new 
councilors and ABO members on their rights and responsibilities.  The ABO constitution 
is a key document in this regard, one that guides and protects day-to-day activities. 
The institutional arrangements allow councilors to participate in development but 
also for the RDCs to manage resources.  ￿We used to think of politicians as the 
custodians of development, but unfortunately they were politicizing....They look [after] 
their own interest,￿ noted one RDC member [CCJr]. 
They benefit only their members and not the community as a whole.  If 
they are in the council, they are only interested in careers and elections. 
They are with you for one year, and then for two years they are 
campaigning.  With the new set up, the RDCs are in the forefront because 
we know every bit of resource that is coming to the compound, and we are 
planning with the councilors.  And we are very successful, and the only 
best way development can be brought to the community [CCJr]. 
Past accomplishments have energized the communities as well.  ￿The residents 
come to the ZDC, and meeting and discuss and keep on pounding.  Now the ZDC and the 
RDC are energized,￿ said one RDC chairman. 
￿Now there is a real jostling for power.  When we started, there was less 
enthusiasm, because they have not seen what is ahead.  They see there is 
water, construction here, drainage going on.  Now they see they can get 29 
benefits.  They see if construction is going on, money is there, and so they 
can benefit.  And also they see there are jobs for us to participate￿ [CCJr]. 
Community residents are recognizing the role of the RDC in community development 
and holding them accountable.  ￿We had a number of programs that we had not 
accomplished by the end of the first program, and the community is coming back to find 
out:  When are you bringing the clinic?￿ [CCJr].  Clearly, community residents work 
because they believe they may receive some benefit.  But this is not necessarily negative.  
Residents are also seeing improvements in their compound, want to be a part of them, 
and appear to be holding the RDC accountable. 
Hall et al. (2003) note that participation is not as widespread as desirable and that 
the ￿elites￿ of the community may have captured the RDC.  While, initially, the less poor 
are more likely to participate in ABOs, the poorer eventually join them.  Still, many 
former ABO members have progressed to political roles as elected councilors.  
￿Conceivably,￿ they write, ￿this was inevitable, and perhaps not undesirable if, through 
their engagement with PROSPECT, these empowered individuals have a better 
understanding of the needs and interests of compound residents.￿ 
Indeed, if elections are free and fair, and information on candidates￿ backgrounds 
and positions widely available, then it is hard to see the drawbacks.  Those chosen for the 
RDC probably are ￿elites,￿ but they are leaders with skills, education, or business 
acumen.  They would be, in fact, the most appropriate candidates for the position.  Why 
should community residents not look to these people for leadership?  As long the 
elections hold them accountable, the fact that they are ￿elite￿ seems to be a benefit.  But 
Hall et al. (2003) specifically worry about CARE￿s insistence that the ABOs be 
apolitical: 
More worryingly, however, it is possible that PROSPECT￿s dedication to 
ensuring that ABOs are apolitical development-oriented institutions has 
actually undermined the development of democracy in Zambia.   
Increasingly, it is argued that enforcing a separation between development 
and politics, though essential for [international NGOs] whose status 30 
depends on their distance from politics, has been detrimental to 
democratization and governance improvements that are said to underpin 
sustainable development.  In the compounds of Lusaka, ten years after the 
political process was released from one-party rule, few people claim to 
respect the integrity of their elected councilors.  Arguably, if residents had 
had reason and evidence to hold councilors accountable, even partially, for 
the allocation and spending of development funds (whatever the source of 
these funds), perhaps these councilors would have become more 
responsible, trustworthy, and better equipped to represent public rather 
than personal interest.  Instead, PROSPECT￿s approach and the weight of 
its considerable financial muscle has prevented this opportunity for local 
democratization. 
Hall et al. (2003) provide no field-based evidence for this criticism.  In fact, their 
comments suggest an opposite conclusion:  that the heavily politicized environment itself 
is responsible for undermining progress, and that an international NGO that brings 
resources and expertise is one of the few organizations that can engage with politicians 
and improve governance.  It is hard to see that further politicization will help unless there 
is fundamental redirection of the electoral process and a deeper understanding and 
acceptance of a competitive multiparty political system.  Unless there is deepening 
democratization, further politicization can only be counterproductive. 
Democratic mechanisms do appear to be taking hold.  Residents have held 
councilors accountable.  They have participated in elections and thrown out certain 
parties.  They are now electing councilors after having observed them operate on behalf 
of the community when they served on the RDCs.  One estimate is that close to half of 
RDC chairpersons progressed to become city councilors (Hall et al. 2003).  This leads to 
a closer link between RDC and council, and a better understanding by the councilor of 
the role of the RDC and its relationships and usefulness to the councilor. 
Overall, the comments also do not reflect the responses received from the various 
focus groups interviewed in this study.  Although some respondents recognized the 
inherent political nature of the councilors (it could be argued this is a positive 
recognition), many also praised the assistance of their councilor and his attendance at 
RDC meetings.  They also stated that the apolitical nature of the ABOs was a benefit, that 31 
it distinguished them from the ￿political￿ structure in that they were concerned with 
community development rather than personal interest or ￿politics.￿  ￿If money was given 
to the politicians, the boreholes would not have been given.  They realize that the 
development can only come through the RDC, and even the council now is giving 
support￿ [Npr].  One participant was even antagonistic toward the introduction of politics 
in the ABOs.  ￿The ZDC,￿ he said, ￿is under the council, and the council is politicians.  
You find there are some underground chairmen￿ [CCJz].  So some political connections 
do exist.  Whether they are beneficial is an empirical question. 
For instance, though multiparty politics has brought a degree of healthy 
competition and accountability, cooperation across party lines is still an obstacle.  If party 
affiliations are forced at the lower level as well, party lines may become fault lines.  As it 
stands, the ￿apolitical￿ ABOs have a mandate to work with whichever parties are in 
power in the compound or at the municipal and national levels.  For instance, councilors 
said that one problem they face is that they rely on the national government for funding, 
but the ministry does not like to fund their initiatives because the councilors belong to the 
opposition [Cnllr].  In one focus group, participants complained that they cannot easily 
dispose of market trash because the people who are in charge of the designated area ￿are 
[members of the] MMD, and so they say you are working with the council [whose 
members all belong to opposition parties], and so we cannot work with you, we cannot 
give you space￿ [CCJz]. 
Experiences in other countries suggest that these lowest local government 
structures, in fact, do operate without the heavy overlay of party politics, that they are 
concerned more with community, not national issues that may rive civil society.  As 
already noted, however, party affiliations at higher levels can affect resource distribution.  
This does not then argue for further politicization but for depolitization and 
professionalization of government service and budget decisions.  While the civil service 
is being strengthened, donors may, in fact, need to circumvent these higher-up structures 
and provide money directly to the local level, although they may need to build capacity of 
these local structures at the same time. 32 
At the same time, some clash of competencies is occurring among national and 
local levels, as national government ￿deconcentrates￿ and the municipality works more 
closely with the ABOs in the compounds.  For instance, the Ministry of Health has 
created Neighborhood Health Committees (NHCs) that vie with the RDCs for control:  
There is an antagonistic approach with some.  RDC is an extension of 
local government.  But CBOs [are] formed by other ministries.  The 
Neighborhood Health Committees are part of the Ministry of Health and it 
brings a bit of tension.  The NHC doesn￿t want to be under RDC.  They 
won￿t tell you what they￿re doing [GKCr]. 
So while the RDCs attempt to exert their authority over development in the 
community, arguing they represent residents￿ interests, the NHCs argue that they have the 
authority of the national government and that they, too, represent the community.  The 
RDC also could potentially clash with the coordinating committees created by the 
national government, which controls much of the budget to support municipal and 
community investments.  The issue now is whether these agencies can reach agreement 
on areas of competency and institutional relations, and still provide significant space for 
independent local (community and municipal) action.  This lack of clarity and clash of 
competencies may limit how much communities can drive development, or may cause 
CDD to get lost in the institutional brambles. 
The lack of participation by most residents and the weak integration of the ABOs 
into the overall system of governance are worrisome.  Both are needed if the ABOs are to 
be accountable, viable, and useful.  Although many residents are aware of the ABOs, a 
very small portion of residents actually participate in ABO elections (Hall et al. 2003).  
For example, Kanyama has about 90,000 people.  Each zone has about 3,000 residents, 
but only about 60 residents in each zone participated in the last elections.  (Elections for 
many compounds were held after the review, so these figures may have changed or be 
different for other compounds.) 
PROSPECT￿s effects on building capacity within the LCC and on creating the 
political, legal, and financial environment needed to sustain the ABO structure after the 33 
end of PROSPECT are unclear.  ABOs, especially at the RDC level, did not seem to have 
engaged strongly or consistently with PROSPECT staff in the development of their 
organizational capacities.  Although some RDCs are finding funding from sources other 
than CARE, few focus-group discussants could clearly describe their needs-assessment or 
fund-raising strategies [CCJr; CCJz; GKCr; GKCz]. 
They acknowledged CARE￿s assistance in the past but were uncertain of the 
future: 
The relationship with CARE has been that of mother and child.  It has 
been the only NGO to work in Chaisa.  The face of Chaisa has changed 
from what it was four years [ago].  We are now able to sit down and 
vision.  We have a leadership that is quite an￿I don￿t know￿for lack of a 
better word, a leadership that is ready to meet the challenges of the 
compound.  We have been exposed to a number of workshops where we 
can stand and fare, even international.  We are still looking for capacity-
building from CARE during no-cost extension.  Strengthening is needed.  
We shouldn￿t say we have enough [CCJr]. 
The focus-group members from the older compounds (George, Kanyama, and 
Chapata) used a number of vivid metaphors to describe the situation [GKCr]: 
CARE is a friend who has packed his bags and now is at the door chatting.  
There is no serious issue.  Otherwise, they might miss their plane. 
They are packing their small bags.  And saying bye-bye.  And we have 
knowledge.  It has left us with knowledge.  If they want to see the RDC 
going ahead, they must leave us the tools, by that I mean, the machines, 
megaphones, graders, shovels, vehicles. 
One exchange among participants particularly underscores the uncertainty that the 
ABOs have about their future and clearly outline the consequences if they are not yet able 
to work entirely on their own. 
We are limping with a crutch.  And if they go, we will slow down our 
pace...until my leg heals. 
And we can walk...[or]...we will just sit. 34 
This lack of clarity about their own capacities and about what CARE￿s exit 
strategy contrasts, for some, with other NGOs like JICA.  For these older compounds, 
CARE has ￿already left￿: 
After CARE or PROSPECT moved out, we feel we were somehow not 
much considered, in that CARE or PROSPECT knows that [in] this group, 
the community we are dealing with, most are vulnerable.  CARE would 
know that...they don￿t have anything.  Maybe something to generate funds 
for them.  JICA implemented a lot of projects...but before they went, they 
took into consideration how these groups were going to work because they 
knew these groups had been working and performing well because of their 
support.  If you have a child or baby that is breastfed, you cannot just 
wean the baby, well, no, you can stop breastfeeding, [but] you cannot 
wean a child just like that.  You must do it step-by-step.  So JICA did it 
bit-by-bit, reduced their support, and came in and told the group that you 
are supposed to group yourself so we are able to give you a hand, and so 
you can carry on with this work....That￿s why they left something.  They 
left 6 million [kwacha] that they gave to the group.  They said this money 
is supposed to be taken back to the group...[GKCz]. 
PROSPECT management suggested that the ABO members￿ lack of knowledge 
and uncertain capacity are due to the fact that, with the reinstitution of elections, many 
RDC members are new.  But at least half of ABO members in all focus groups had years 
of experience working with CARE.  On the other hand, the comment highlights a genuine 
threat:  membership turnover among the ABOs can easily pose a challenge to sustaining 
their capacity.  This suggests CARE has to develop an institution-building strategy that 
will maintain the capacities of the ABOs over time, even with new elections. 
Empowerment and Social Ties 
Under the one-party state and socialist bent of previous governments, 
communities came to expect that the state or the party would provide everything from 
social services to jobs.  One of the principal accomplishments of PROSPECT has been to 
make the community aware of its own responsibilities and capacities.  ￿[Before] the 
initiative was not there.  But now because of putting the initiative, they have come to 35 
know that if they want to live decently, they must do [it] themselves￿ [CCJr].  Although 
activities have not been as well planned or as effective as possible, PROSPECT has 
undoubtedly contributed to increasing community capacity to plan for development and 
engage with a range of development actors.  The community has learned it has the right 
to make demands on its elected representatives, and the activities themselves have 
improved social ties among residents as they work together. 
Organizational and Community Capacities 
Staff Vision and Training 
Discussions and comments from PROSPECT management and CARE senior 
advisors make it clear that, in the past, PUSH II and PROSPECT had significant, 
effective emphasis on reflection and organizational learning.  As explained above, staff 
were empowered, well-trained in participatory methods, and conscious of their part in a 
process-driven project.  The PROSPECT strategy fit within the overall strategy and 
mission of the country office. 
With the maturation of the project, that focus was lost.  Current PROSPECT IB 
staff could not articulate how their actions fit into an overall strategy, now or in the past, 
or how they were working to ensure transition and sustainability.  They could not 
meaningfully articulate CARE￿s contribution to CDD or governance.  Staff themselves 
described their actions as reactive rather than strategically supportive.  Staff showed little 
depth in analyzing the project, its strategies, or its effects, often explaining what ￿should 
have happened￿ rather than what actually happened in response to questions [Prs].  
Community residents did not talk about any especially structured activities with clear 
objectives with CARE either.  As detailed above, the disengagement of CARE from the 
communities was palpable, and neither had a solid idea of what had been accomplished, 
what the next goals were, nor how to accomplish them. 
These exchanges raised questions about whether current staff have the needed 
skills and understanding to support PROSPECT￿s transition.  The low levels of staff 36 
understanding and energy may be due to the fact that PROSPECT expected to close in 
early 2003.  Many skilled and experienced staff have left.  But learning, empowerment, 
and ownership should be priority tasks for any process project.  PROSPECT￿s current 
situation may simply highlight how projects change over time, and how projects that 
support CDD and scaling-up must plan well for transition and ending.  In PROSPECT￿s 
case, at perhaps the most crucial time in transition, when the need for supporting and 
training local structures to be sustainable was greatest, the most capable staff left. 
Financial Resources 
As with any successful development project, a CDD program must have sufficient 
resources to implement planned activities.  With PROSPECT, funding seems to have 
been sufficient.  The more serious threat to sustainability comes from not having 
sufficient funds to continue ABO operations, once the project ends.
2 
The ABO offices will not require substantial amounts of money, but current 
sources are unsure. 
Operationally we are just institutions that have been put into place, minus 
direct funding.  The RDC is an office which needs some little bit of 
money.  There are things we cannot just go and apply for a project asking 
for 20,000 kwacha [$4.00].  Even if it is only 500,000 kwacha per year, 
that￿s okay.  Some money for chairman￿s transport, some stationery...even 
the bank accounts we have done with our own money.  We feel there must 
be some funding for the operation of the RDC.  For now there is CARE, 
but if CARE goes away, they are not there [CCJr]. 
The water scheme is supposed to provide the RDC (but not the ZDC, which also 
need funds) with 5 percent of its operating revenue.  This seems to be a good idea, and 
takes advantage of synergies among projects (IB and II).  It also wisely redirects 
community revenues back to the community itself.  While a good idea, there are 
problems.  The system is not fully functional, and needs to be institutionalized.  For now, 
                                                 
2 Though not the focus of this study, a similar concern occurs with respect to the water systems.   
Apparently there are enough funds for operation and routine maintenance, now that they have been 
constructed, but no reliable source of money for major repairs or replacement. 37 
funding is inconsistent, potentially too small, and may be withheld, until the water 
scheme is better established. 
The amounts from the water scheme are not large, say the RDC members in 
Chaisa.  ￿Maybe Chaisa is just started with the 5 percent.  The scheme doesn￿t have 
money [say 70,000 kwacha/month, or about USD14].  Yes, we accept and appreciate that 
amount.  But it￿s not even enough for a transport for a week.  We need some additional, 
some IGA that will be generating income￿ [CCJr]. 
￿In Chibolya, the scheme hasn￿t paid the RDC for five months.  I don￿t know 
why.  If we ask, they say we are interfering just because we are asking for that 5 percent.  
We got the message from CARE that the RDCs are interfering￿ [CCJr].  ￿We were told 
we were interfering with the running of the water scheme...saying we were always 
ask[ing] for money for the management.￿  Another explained:  ￿We are told that we must 
wait until the trust is legalized.  And we are still waiting for that￿ [CCJr]. 
If the water schemes do not generate surpluses, of course, the ABOs will get 
nothing.  And it is unlikely that the municipal government will allocate funds to these 
ABOs:  after all, one of the motives for decentralizing was to reduce municipal budget 
commitments. 
Voluntarism 
One consistent plaint throughout the life of PROSPECT has been that the work 
done by community residents is entirely voluntary.  The community workers who build 
the infrastructure must donate their time.  ABO members also do not get paid, although 
members of the water and microfinance boards now get a ￿sitting allowance.￿ 
CARE and DfID￿s insistence on voluntarism was due to concerns that FFW 
created dependency and led to a lost sense of community ownership.  ￿Many projects 
were unfinished or not kept up because they were not owned by the community.  They 
[even] had names.  There is the ￿World Bank Project,￿ they would say￿ [CCJr].  
Mobilization of community labor for the voluntary contribution of labor is thus an 
essential part of the tasks of the RDCs.  But the conditions of voluntarism have 38 
potentially allowed only certain groups of people to participate and excluded direct 
benefits to the neediest.  ￿One problem was the poverty level,￿ said one RDC observer, 
￿because people who are coming to participate in these programs, they come to look for 
food.  Otherwise, they look for work, so at the end of the day they can have something to 
eat for their families.  There is a lot of voluntary work [on the project], so people used to 
shun the project￿ [CCJr].  ￿We are saying that voluntarism is very difficult to sustain.  All 
of us here are breadwinners, but while we are here, our families are saying ￿Your father is 
coming with a loaf of bread￿￿ [CCJr]. 
Focus-group respondents seemed to accept that the laborers were not paid, but 
raised questions about why those on the water and microfinance boards received an 
allowance, while those on the ABOs did not.  Not even the community residents believe 
that they do not receive some sort of financial benefit.  ￿The community will be saying 
you are getting something.  They don￿t believe we are not getting anything.  They say 
how can you work so hard when you are not getting￿ [CCJz]. 
The well-known problems surrounding provision of public goods emerge here:  
free-riding, private burdens for public consumption.  Residents realize that although the 
individual benefits from knowledge, the greater benefit is to the community:  ￿We just do 
voluntary work.  We are not paid anything.  And we can go to the workshop and be there 
for quite a long period of time, and we are not paid anything.  Just bread and drink and 
nchima.  We just go and spend a lot of hours and your children are crying and they want 
food￿ [CCJz].  When you leave, said one, ￿you have taken just a cup of tea and 
knowledge￿ [CCJz]. ￿And so it benefits the community and not the family￿ [CCJz]. 
The contentiousness surrounding voluntarism is receding, however, as 
institutional arrangements become more established.  The ABOs are now raising their 
own funds, and they can design their own programs, in which they may choose to pay 
laborers.  As noted, CARE has also worked to secure nominal ￿sitting allowances￿ for 
board members on the water and microfinance boards.  The two main problems in 
sponsoring an allowance for ABO members, however, are that the ABOs do not yet have 
a stable source of financing, nor is it clear who on the ABO should get an allowance.  As 39 
discussed below, the more pressing need is for money just to support the daily operations 
of the ABOs.  ABO members in the focus groups did not ask for stipends for themselves, 
but rather for funds to ensure effective operation of the ABO in the community [CCJr; 
GKCr; GKCz; Npr].  CARE has also begun to experiment with contracting paid 
community labor for the work on infrastructure [RC].  The issue of voluntarism will 
likely occur in all CDD projects.  While its resolution may differ with the circumstances, 
one clear principle is to ensure that all actors understand responsibilities and benefits 
from the beginning, and that rules are applied fairly and consistently.  In financing 
arrangements, community labor in any case should be included as part of community 
inputs. 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
A core principle of PROSPECT was the creation of a learning environment.  This 
implies an efficient, effective use of information.  As discussed above, PUSH II 
certainly￿and later PROSPECT￿do seem to have possessed this perspective, but it 
diminished over time.  An important source of information for learning and monitoring 
performance is a project￿s own management information system.  A project intent on 
scaling up may need one more than most as an effective system will allow the 
organization to adapt and change as it expands.  An effective system would also provide 
the appropriate incentives to keep the organization focused on CDD.  PROSPECT￿s 
monitoring and evaluation system appears to have been weak in both these areas (Hall et 
al. 2003). 
PROSPECT has developed a toolkit of participative methods, survey instruments 
(including the PANA), and training resources that encompass its participatory approach 
and ideology.  A recent review, however, finds them ￿fundamentally unchanged since 
early PUSH II days,￿ despite recommendations in the PUSH II evaluation.  PROSPECT￿s 
own instruments for performance and impact evaluation are not internally consistent 
among themselves or across time, nor are they synergistic across interventions (Hall et al. 
2003). 40 
Baseline surveys and follow-up surveys were also not adequate to measure 
livelihood gains among participants or the communities, especially social and political 
capital, which were among the most important potential outcomes of the project.  These 
shortcomings deprive PROSPECT of an evidence base from which to learn and on which 
to make decisions about future project direction or design subsequent interventions (Hall 
et al. 2003). 
In discussions, staff concentrated more on outputs than impact, apparently 
assuming that concrete outputs and structures would lead to impact [Prs].  But building 
sustainable institutional capacity requires more than creating outputs.  It must ensure the 
environment exists for the outputs to be used.  Yet PROSPECT currently has no study of 
how to progress beyond its outputs, no concrete strategy for its Institution Building, as it 
does for other components.  PROSPECT apparently not yet made any study of key 
questions about how these structures work, their weaknesses, and potential strategies to 
strengthen them.  Key questions to ask would include how representative the ABOs are; 
how successful they are at increasing community participation and trust in government; 
how capable they are of leading development; how much community residents interact 
with them; how they are incorporated into municipal planning; how financially, legally, 
and politically stable they are; and what needs to be done to address weaknesses. 
PROSPECT also has not coordinated with other databases or agencies to explore 
potential synergies in information.  ZAMSIF, for example, has created and managed a 
national poverty database.  But PROSPECT has interacted little if at all with ZAMSIF, 
perhaps losing an opportunity to influence national poverty assessment standards and 
policies based on PROSPECT￿s experiences with the urban poor (Hall et al. 2003). 
Another surprising result is that ABOs in non-PROSPECT areas seemed to have 
as good a grasp of the concept of community development and of the roles and 
responsibilities of the ABOs as those in PROSPECT areas.  Some members from 
PROSPECT areas felt they had greater capabilities than those from non-PROSPECT 
compounds:  ￿We possess more knowledge than those from non-PROSPECT areas.  We 
can stand and contribute and articulate￿ [GKCr].  A focus-group interview with five non-41 
PROSPECT compounds, however, indicated that even in these areas, ABOs were 
established and functioning:  council staff had given them training in leadership and 
democracy, and they generally had good relations with their councilors.  Although this 
represents experience in only five of the remaining 21 non-PROSPECT compounds, it 
does indicate capacity among council staff to carry out work similar to that done by 
PROSPECT. 
In the end, then, neither staff nor available documentation provided convincing 
evidence of causal impact on critical institution-building issues and their influence on 
livelihood outcomes.  This conclusion leads to various questions:  What did CARE do? 
How did it expand its impact to others? What was CARE￿s unique contribution? Is 
CARE even needed? But CARE should be able to provide convincing evidence of the 
effectiveness of its approaches to donors (thereby promoting change among the donor 
community to support its approach).  Answering these questions will also provide fodder 
for internal reflection, learning, and change. 
Organizational Impacts of Expansion: Internal Links and External Synergies 
Project growth has meant increases in staff size and in staff organization, but 
PROSPECT handled this fairly routinely.  Other changes seem to have occurred 
naturally, and gradually as a result of project maturation.  The change from a process 
project has been described above. 
Scaling up CDD requires mounting a level of intervention above the household 
and even above the community.  Perhaps most visibly, new stakeholders became 
involved as PROSPECT￿s activities changed.  PROSPECT resisted this at first, and even 
tried to skirt engaging with the government.  Soon, however, PROSPECT management 
recognized that a successful project would require technical expertise beyond the 
community and appropriate legal frameworks.  ￿The intervention needed to be well-
coordinated with government and city policy and requirements (in many cases, water 
would come from city mains).  We were in a situation of questionable groundwater 
supply.  Designs and procurement processes would be complex￿ (Hedley 2003).  42 
Consequently, PROSPECT￿s list of stakeholders and partners has expanded over the 
years.  From the initial community residents on the RDC, stakeholders and partners now 
include the city water supply, the municipal council, national local government 
ministries, and even donors interested in democratic governance (such as Ireland Aid). 
PROSPECT also led or influenced other projects that emerged to support CDD or 
to replicate the approach elsewhere.  For example, the Urban Insaka initiative came about 
when other organizations began demanding information about PROSPECT￿s community-
driven approach, catalyzed by a CARE conference on urban livelihoods in Birmingham 
in 1998.  Urban Insaka￿s goal was to document the process and synthesize lessons 
learned.  C3 was established to fund community-initiated projects, a necessary support to 
CDD.  Mahavita in Madagascar and CULP in other cities in Zambia are direct 
descendants of PROSPECT, and they basically replicate its approach. 
PROSPECT￿s engagement with these stakeholders and influence over new 
projects has given it credibility and allowed it to make valuable and widely-recognized 
contributions to new policies, programs, and institutional strategies.  However, 
PROSPECT has failed to capitalize on the full range of opportunities that its presence 
permitted (Hall et al. 2003).  Observations for this study revealed a lack of coordination 
and synergy with internal initiatives as well.  A few community proposals to C3 
languished and missed deadlines when brought up through the PROSPECT structure 
(though, in other instances, PROSPECT staff were instrumental in getting information to 
communities, which then applied for C3 directly).  Although Urban Insaka exists as a 
unique opportunity for organizational documentation and learning, PROSPECT has made 
little effort to take advantage of it.  Exchanges to date have been limited, and 
organizational incentives are lacking for them to work with each other.  Links between 
PROSPECT and CULP have been scarce after the initiation of CULP, and in that sense 
each has not learned as much as possible from the other.  CULP, for instance, seems to 
have maintained the CDD focus lost to PROSPECT, and CULP encountered political 
problems with councilors opposed to the spread of the ABO structures, predictable from 
PROSPECT￿s experience. 43 
Exit or Transition? 
PROSPECT is now ending, which means CARE￿s funding is ending as well.  But 
whether CARE has created sustainable structures to continue CDD is not certain.  As 
noted above, PROSPECT has lost some of its emphasis on process, and on building 
capacities that go along with that; it has concentrated on the existence of schemes, 
institutions, or agreements rather than on efficient functioning for sustainability of the 
ABOs.  Thus, the transition strategy is incomplete.  As in a traditional project, it 
emphasizes ￿phase out￿ and ￿shut down￿ when transition to different types of 
interventions and support may be more appropriate.  In the long term, certainly CARE 
should scale down and phase out, and to a large extent CARE￿s work is done in terms of 
restructuring the ABOs and altering the institutional landscape so it incorporates and 
supports them.  But CARE has not yet thought strategically about how to make this 
arrangement sustainable.  Rather, when asked, staff say, ￿Well, we haven￿t finished so we 
keep going.  Bits and pieces are left￿ [Prs].  What those bits and pieces are, and how 
CARE should support them strategically so that ABOs become a protected, integrated 
part of the institutional arrangements and a key component of CDD, has not yet been 
determined. 
Maintaining Community-Driven Development 
From the point of view of establishing ABOs as part of the local government 
structure, PROSPECT has had success.  But was it, or has it remained, community-
driven?  Does the PROSPECT experience suggest there are organizational threats to 
CDD that emerge over time in the process of scaling up?  Although it is of major 
significance that the city council now promotes and supports the establishment of ABOs 
in each peri-urban compound in Lusaka, it remains to be seen whether ABOs are 
sustainably established so they will continue after PROSPECT￿s end. 
First, although PUSH II was almost certainly a community-driven project, a 
￿process project,￿ PROSPECT seems much less so.  Water supply was undoubtedly a 44 
priority in the compounds where PROSPECT worked, but was it really the highest 
priority?  The denoting of the ￿triad￿ of interventions (IB, II, MF) itself suggests that 
activities were determined before the PANA, and not as a result of community demand. 
Hall et al. (2003) cast further doubt on how much the community drove project 
selection and implementation, and how much PROSPECT worked to build the robust, 
sustainable operation of the ABOs.  In Chaisa, for example, the RDC has implemented a 
drainage project on its own, but it was not one of the top 11 projects identified in the 
needs assessment. 
Of course, these observations do not necessarily mean that PROSPECT was not 
community-driven.  Water may indeed have been the highest priority in all areas.  Or 
CARE may have predetermined the set of interventions it would sponsor, and the 
community could still have identified its own needs through the PANA and then worked 
to meet them independently of PROSPECT.  That seems to have been the case in Chaisa. 
Although PROSPECT could have done more to establish and promote CDD, the 
communities still seem to have agreed that getting a water system in place was a high 
priority.  It is just that other aspects of the project drove the process as well.  For 
example, the initial compounds were chosen for a FFW program.  These were peri-urban 
areas where the municipal government hardly entered, and which, as part of the FFW 
program, needed infrastructure.  These peri-urban areas were unlikely to be part of the 
municipal water system and likely to have water as a principal livelihoods issue.  As a 
result, the ODA review did not discourage PUSH II from continuing to build 
infrastructure. 
The final evaluation of PUSH II, as it transitioned to PROSPECT, actually 
encouraged a focus on water.  The report stated:  ￿Water appears to have been a major 
element in the success of all components of PUSH II, and the existence of a serious water 
problem (plus the possibility of a technical solution) should be a primary criterion in 
selecting new compounds￿ (Barton, Crapper, and Tempest 1997).  The formal selection 
process developed later specifically cited the ￿lack of infrastructure￿ as a key criterion.  
The PUSH II final evaluation then seems to have suggested a reversion to the more 45 
traditional project model, where the project￿s intervention, rather than community need, 
more directly drove the process. 
Over time, PROSPECT changed from a process project to one increasingly 
focused on activities.  PROSPECT￿s change in the initial terms it used to describe 
interventions from ￿personal empowerment￿ to ￿microfinance,￿ and from ￿social 
empowerment￿ to ￿institution-building,￿ tracks this transformation (D. Hedley, personal 
communication, 2003).  The shift also reflects a feeling among project leadership that it 
just ￿wasn￿t going to be possible to begin planning water projects after PANAs had 
identified the need.  It would have taken years to get the process underway in each 
compound￿ (D. Hedley, personal communication, 2003).  This sense of urgency replaced 
the focus on process.  In actuality, with good planning, any ￿delay￿ need not have been 
much longer than the time needed to conduct a PANA.  In any case, CARE phased in 
water projects over a period of years, so implementation took years anyway, and often 
long after initial planning.  In the end, a genuine community priority for water, 
evaluations that encouraged water schemes and shifted the focus from CDD, and donors 
that stressed outputs over process led to PROSPECT￿s own emphasis on water schemes 
(and microfinance) in the transition from PUSH II.  As a result, the focus shifted from 
process to specific activities of previously determined project elements. 
CARE would argue that PROSPECT simply used water as an entry point for 
community empowerment and overall community development and that it was not meant 
to be a water-service-provision project.  But PROSPECT￿s IB staff or documents do not 
bear out this argument in any convincing fashion.  ABO members from older and more 
recent compounds agree that water was not the sole mandate of the ABOs.  They are 
perhaps clearer on this point, commenting that, ￿The major item was water first of all; the 
other items would come later￿ [CCJz], and ￿Our focus was not only water.  But we 
couldn￿t do them at the same time￿ [CCJz]. 
A pure process project, truly driven by the community, is difficult to fit within the 
planning structures and budget cycles of governments, donors, and implementing 
organizations.  Generally a donor intends to target a particular area with a single project, 46 
and so it needs to know how much to budget.  How often are donors willing to dedicate a 
specific amount to an area, regardless of purpose?  How often are they willing to forward 
regardless of amount, if it has already determined the purpose?  Wouldn￿t the donor need 
to know, say, whether it will finance costly infrastructure or less expensive microfinance 
groups?  Potentially the donor could consider funding separate phases, with community 
assessments and project preparation in a first phase, and then a second phase of funding 
the selected intervention￿although some might argue this would delay response to 
community needs.  And others could then argue that without a participatory assessment, 
this response could be misdirected?  In actuality, the ODA review recommended a two-
step process.  First, CARE and communities should undertake participatory studies.  
They should then design the project and only then request funding. 
This recommendation was unusual, and most donors continue to focus on outputs, 
and not process.  This is partially a result of how projects are structured.  Even though 
community participation may be encouraged, the project focus (say, water or health) is 
already known.  Participation and output are thus part and parcel of the same project.  A 
potentially more beneficial model would have some projects focus on developing 
capacities and proposals, and other, separate projects provide funds to respond to those 
individual community-identified needs.  These funds could respond across an array of 
needs, but would not confine themselves to any one geographic community.  In this way, 
￿the project￿ would respond to community needs. 
With the more widespread availability of social investment funds to which 
communities can apply for assistance, despite the potential for delays, the two-stage 
approach suggested by ODA seems more in line with the sorts of structures needed to 
support effective CDD.  In Zambia, for instance, ZAMSIF (Zambian Social Investment 
Fund) and CARE￿s C3 program can play this role.  But procedures must be streamlined 
to respond as quickly as possible to community needs, and donors should know how to 
promote these sorts of funds (which may involve working around their own institution￿s 
processes, cycles, and operating procedures). 47 
It may seem that these observations imply it is in the nature of any project, even a 
community-driven one, to become less process-oriented as it moves from 
conceptualization to implementation.  This is not necessarily so.  CULP is another CARE 
project that has worked on a vast array of projects identified by the community.  We can 
also contrast PROSPECT with Mahavita, an urban livelihoods program in Madagascar 
modeled on PROSPECT.  So far, although younger than PUSH/PROSPECT, Mahavita 
appears to have maintained a focus on community empowerment and choice, even as it 
undertook FFW projects with the communities. 
In broad terms, both PROSPECT and Mahavita followed similar steps in working 
with communities to build capacity: 
•  conduct a needs assessment, 
•  identify priorities, 
•  note where CARE has funds to meet that priority, and 
•  work with communities to find ways to meet other needs. 
Mahavita focused less on project implementation and more on producing a 
community development plan.  In interviews, Mahavita staff were clear about keeping 
overall community development at the forefront (Garrett 2003).  As such, the staff and 
community stakeholders of Mahavita realized that CARE funded rehabilitation of 
community infrastructure (canals) as a first project, but this met only one of many needs.  
Staff recognized that they needed to work with the community-based structures to find 
funding for identified priorities (though they did not generally succeed and clearly needed 
greater guidance here!).  By following these steps sequentially with communities, project 
staff can assist communities in building capacity to understand planning, write proposals, 
relate to donors, raise money, and manage all aspects of a project. 
Mahavita￿s work then emerged as step-strategy to build capacity:  without 
forgetting the other needs, CARE would support projects for which it already had funds 
(canal rehabilitation in this case).  This would give the community structures the 48 
opportunity to manage a project.  The explicit strategy then had allowed the communities 
to develop the capacity to determine community priorities, design a community 
development in response, and design and manage a project.  The community structures 
then were to rely on this experience when seeking funds to meet the remaining needs, a 
process with which CARE would assist.  One of the best ways to build community 
capacity (or the capacity of any partner) is to help them do something concrete and 
meaningful (Hall et al. 2003).  PROSPECT did not possess such an explicit strategy.  At 
present, neither PROSPECT nor Mahavita has been very effective at building the 
capacity of community structures to reach out for funding beyond CARE.  This is a major 
aim of the second phase of Mahavita, while PROSPECT currently has no formal plan to 
work at this before it closes down. 
8.  Conclusions 
Scaling-up is ultimately about spreading impact.  It has multiple dimensions that 
emerge as the project itself, still focused on its goals and principles, changes over time.  
Table 1 captures these multiple, often progressive and overlapping, dimensions of 
scaling-up and highlights the fact that multiple dimensions require multiple layers of 
actions and engagement with different stakeholders at different times. 
Recognizing this explicitly is useful for planning and strategic purposes.  
PROSPECT￿s experiences illustrate some of these aspects of scaling-up.  PROSPECT 
has been a process project, with a strong component of adaptability and learning.  It had 
an initial focus on empowerment and worked on creating the internal and external 
environment to favor change.  PROSPECT￿s early years especially evince an ability to 
learn and change, as it added activities and revised manuals and procedures. 
In large part, PROSPECT has been successful.  PROSPECT has developed links 
with many stakeholders, especially the LCC.  Officially, ABOs are part of government; 
the municipality has taken on much of the responsibility for expanding the structures and 49 
for training their members.  This is strong evidence of scaling-up, which will then allow 
the project to scale down. 
Strong conceptual thinking and experience continue to exist at the top.  Project 
management and CARE senior staff generally possess a deep understanding of 
development processes and the political environment.  PROSPECT is in an enviable 
position within CARE to leverage other resources and support its strategy to leave a 
legacy of sustainable CDD.  Urban Insaka can assist in documenting procedures and 
lessons.  With an extension, C3 can be a source of funds for ABO projects.  Sustainable 
scaling-up, however, will require PROSPECT to work further to strengthen and 
institutionalize the ABOS on a number of fronts:  obtaining financial stability through 
revenue sources or allocations; political and legal stability through clear and accepted 
roles, rules, and responsibilities through enforced constitutions and bylaws that players 
abide by; and technical and administrative capacity of ZDCs, RDCs, councilors, and 
council staff.  These elements must exist within a system that flows needs and plans up, 
and resources and an enabling environment down.  PROSPECT must also transform 
itself￿its activities and its staff￿if it is to scale up and meet the changing needs of the 
project and its stakeholders. 
Lessons for Scaling-Up 
Against this backdrop (summarized in Table 2), we may draw a few lessons: 
1.  Successful scaling-up inevitably requires project staff and management to learn 
and adapt their approaches and activities to local needs and conditions.  Careful 
piloting and systematic review of lessons from other projects can help, but still it 
is important to scale up processes or the broad outlines of an intervention, not 
simply replicate the mechanics. 50 





Funder: PROSPECT: ODA (now DFID); PUSH II: also WFP 
 
ABOs (RDCs and ZDCs), the focus of this study, are responsible for overall community 




•  Training of ABOs, councilors and council staff (leadership, democracy, conflict 
resolution, gender, etc.) 




•  ODA review mission and focus on process projects 
•  CARE￿s desire to continue work in peri-urban areas once PUSH I ended 




•  National policy of decentralization, need for community representation 
•  Need to bring peri-urban areas under municipal authority  
•  Recognition that national/municipal government did not have resources to supply 
services 
•  Donor (funding, philosophy) and country mission support 
•  Capacity building among staff in participatory methods/learning organization 
•  Partnered with government 
•  Had resources available 
•  Prestige and ￿weight￿ of CARE 
•  Began smaller and grew over time 
LIMITING 
FACTORS/CHALLENGES 
•  Government lack of interest 
•  Political obstacles 
•  Donor frameworks and requirements  
•  Focus on outputs, budget setups and cycles, monitoring and evaluation indicators 
•  Resources to respond and build capacity 
•  Staff capacity and skills 
•  Sustainability of focus on community over time 
•  Transformation and transition 
•  Staff, funding lines, stakeholders, activities 
•  Weaving sustainable CDD into social and institutional fabric 
•  Spreading to other 




•  Expanded operations from 3 to 11 compounds 
•  Facilitated integration of ABO into municipal governance structure for all compounds 




•  Added environmental health, gender, and HIV/AIDS components 
•  Linked with other projects like KAR (urban waste management program)  
•  ABOs constructed clinics and police posts and community centers 
•  Expanded down to create and support ZDCs 
•  Supported creation of ABO federation 





•  Service delivery: FFW built infrastructure (PUSH I)  
•  Community capacity development: redirected ABOs 
•  Policy reform: integration of ABOs into local governance structure; member of 
NDCC; promotion of federation of ABOs 






•  Cross-training and cross-sectoral coordination of CARE staff  
•  Training of ABOs and LCC members, council staff  
•  Connecting ABOs to water schemes for revenue 
•  Assisting with finding donors, writing proposals 
•  Spin-offs and incorporation of RDCs in other structures  51 
This means the promoting organization must be a learning organization.  Staff 
must have a keen understanding of the principles of CDD; they must be willing to 
empower communities, and also be analytical, flexible, and responsive.  For this to 
happen, staff must be well-trained, and project management (and above) must actively 
promote a similarly empowering and learning environment for staff. 
To regain its learning aspects and better understand how to institutionalize 
scaling-up, CARE still needs to develop better mechanisms to elucidate its impact.  In 
PROSPECT, evaluators had little hard evidence of CARE￿s specific contribution to 
creating sustainable, effective government structures or to sustainable livelihoods.  
PROSPECT lacked a rigorous methodology for evaluation to complement the focus-
group information, and provided little detail on CARE￿s role in the redirection and spread 
of ABOs and how they have influenced community participation and livelihood security. 
Staff argued that, among other things, this was because PROSPECT is a process 
project or that no further research was needed, that responding to donors was 
unnecessary, that the most important thing was having impact at the community level.  
But even in a ￿process project￿ and most important when CARE desires to improve its 
impact, CARE has to be able to delineate what it did, what impact it had, and why.  
Without this, CARE has no means to identify what levers are important, what strategies 
work (especially if it intends to argue that the strategies of other donors, consulting firms, 
or operational organizations are flawed).  Importantly, this may suggest we need a new 
language to talk about evaluation of impact and of sustainability among facilitating 
organizations.  We may need to identify new indicators and new benchmarks to identify 
￿impact,￿ shape the monitoring and evaluation system, and convey credible stories of 
contribution and influence to donors, and promote internal learning and change.  But that 
also involves greater reflection within CARE than has been the case so far for 
strategically changing the project, mission, governmental, and donor environment. 52 
2.  Simplistically, scaling up CDD requires communities to be able to make 
demands, and authorities to be able to respond.  If authorities do not have the 
technical capacity, will, or resources to respond, CDD will almost certainly fail.  
Government authorities, with no resources, have little reason to concern 
themselves with community needs or demands.  With no response, communities 
have little reason to concern themselves with government.  Instead, they will get 
discouraged and the structures will become moribund.  Authorities must be able 
to validate and energize the connection with the community, and respond to the 
community￿s ￿drive for development.￿ 
Of course, this depends not only on individual institutional capabilities and 
resources but also on how the larger environment constrains or promotes their actions 
(including whether the appropriate legal structures or other mechanisms for 
communication and action even exist).  PROSPECT profited from an enabling national 
environment that was emphasizing democratic openness, decentralization, and the 
emergence of a multitude of parties.  PROSPECT worked to link as well as increase the 
capacities of both the demand and supply side of promotion of CDD.  It energized and 
redirected existing community-level governance structures and was the catalyst for an 
ABO constitution that clearly outlined roles and responsibilities of council, RDC, and 
ZDC. 
PROSPECT built capacity and understanding among communities and service 
providers and linkers by providing formal training for ZDC and RDC members as well as 
council staff and councilors.  It funded water projects that the communities had identified 
as priorities.  Working along side communities and council staff on a daily basis until 
they are able to operate satisfactorily on their own seems to be a sensible strategy.  
PROSPECT still needs to assess where different communities are in terms of 
sustainability, which ones have PLAs (participatory learning assessments), which ones 
have expertise to design projects, experience to raise funds, and so on.  This sort of 53 
continual evaluation of the institutional landscape would seem to be a prime requirement 
for successful scaling-up. 
3.  CDD will almost always involve reallocation of resources and creating or 
reforming governing institutions.  As a result, politics will almost certainly enter 
the picture.  The PROSPECT experience shows that the project cannot and should 
not avoid politics.  If ignored, authorities and others who feel threatened or 
excluded can act to undermine the project, whereas if the program engages them, 
they may work to support it.  They may leverage funds, influence or recruit 
others, or advise how future plans or pitfalls may affect the project. 
In a pilot phase, a project usually keeps local political authorities well informed.  
It does not pose a threat to the political system as a whole, and local authorities often 
welcome the project as bringing in extra funds.  But the scene changes when the political 
structures are scaled up.  As these structures often control or manage substantial 
resources, and are seen as having responsibility for the project (rather than, as before, the 
local political authority), the local political authority comes to see them as a threat to their 
position.  At the same time, they may view the project as an opportunity to consolidate 
their position, if they can become involved.  They may want and may deserve some say 
about how resources are allocated or institutions reformed or set up.  Politics will almost 
inevitably arise in the process of scaling up CDD, particularly in an urban environment 
where political players are thick and the opportunities for interference rife.  A successful 
project will anticipate and develop a strategy to deal with it. 
Acquiring local political support is one basic element of that strategy.  
PROSPECT mistakenly avoided political engagement at the beginning, but ultimately 
used a consultative process to get buy-in from stakeholders (councilors, council staff, 
RDCs, ZDCs).  This process, and additional training, clarified roles, alleviated fears, and 
helped councilors to see how the ABOs could help them carry out their responsibilities 
instead of threatening to overtake them.  The process created workable, participatory, 54 
non-threatening community structures.  Any strategy, however, should recognize that the 
political actors are multiple and varied; there is no ￿one￿ government actor, so scaling-up 
will require communicating with multiple actors, understanding their concerns, needs, 
and perspectives, and engaging those concerns in a meaningful way. 
Scaling-up also needs to clearly identify the place of the ABO within the local 
government structure.  In Lusaka, confusion resulted when ABOs were supposed to be 
simply CBOs, yet were clearly connected (often through the councilor) to city 
government.  Councilors were ex officio members of the RDCs; some councilors felt they 
should control the RDC, and also be voting members.  The current arrangement makes 
the RDCs and ZDCs lowest levels of local government, although they are supposedly 
nonpartisan.  After the consultation and preparation of the new constitution, councilors 
now accept that RDCs are integral parts of local government.  It remains to be seen 
whether the RDCs and ZDCs can continue to function as true voices of the community, 
or whether they become as partisan as previous RDCs were. 
Mahavita in Madagascar presents a different model, however, because it is in the 
early stages and is not yet sure how effective that model is.  There, the municipal 
government designates a committee to operate as the neighborhood authority.  Residents 
elect a committee, a CBO, separate from this community authority to liaise with the 
authority, coordinate development activities in the community, and represent their 
interests before the government.  The most important thing for reducing political 
interference in the case of both Mahavita and PROSPECT, however, seems to be that all 
stakeholders are clear on rights, responsibilities, and roles. 
4.  Successful scaling up of ABOs, as key representations of CDD, does seem to 
require that the ABOs attain some sort of official recognition.  PROSPECT scaled 
up ￿successfully￿ because the government took on the ABO structure and wove it 
into the social and institutional fabric.  The council adopted and expanded the 
￿redirected￿ ABO structure to all peri-urban areas in Lusaka.  That would seem to 
be the very definition of successful scaling-up.  The project has moved from an 55 
individual accessing of benefits to incorporation into government structure.  It 
now has to prove effective at improving city planning and promoting community 
development. 
Of course, CDD need not be an explicit part of government, but if the local 
structure intends to be the voice of the community for overall development, it does seem 
necessary that it be part of government or have some (preferably officialized) interaction 
with it.  Otherwise, the structure lacks authority to speak for the community or coordinate 
activities.  If the ABO is intended to push or coordinate plans, it needs to have an official 
relationship with government.  A multi-action CBO has no ￿convening authority￿ on its 
own￿it still needs the backing of law. 
5.  Scaling-up also means making changes in project activities as the project matures 
and development occurs.  Different stakeholders become more or less important 
with changes. 
For the communities, this emphasizes the importance of an approach that stresses 
capacity building and creates linkages and partnerships so communities can effectively 
address their chosen priorities.  The role of donors and government is to work to build 
these community capacities and create an institutional and legal framework, and an 
environment, where CDD can occur. 
From the perspective of the facilitating organization, the need to allow for 
program evolution means that the need for particular staff skills also changes, perhaps 
even necessitating shifts in the composition of staff.  Scaling-up is not ￿community-
contained,￿ but instead is a process of transformation and maturation that necessarily 
extends beyond the community to other stakeholders and structures.  Self-criticism and 
intellectual engagement outside the project are essential.  Without openness to 
institutional learning, project staff risk becoming insular and intellectually stagnant, 
￿replicating￿ rather than adapting successfully to the challenges of scaling-up. 56 
Once ABO structures were revitalized, for instance, attention turned to training 
them and to supporting the council￿s work with them.  Now that the mechanism for this is 
in place, resources for operating these structures and responding to their demands are 
needed; this shifts the focus to working with ABOs on fund-raising, identifying donors, 
and working with the LCC and ministries for budget allocations.  These community 
structures may also clash with the competencies of other governmental authorities:  the 
focus shifts from training the ABOs to facilitating communication among various 
stakeholders. 
The need to respond to changing needs of stakeholders as CDD matures also casts 
a different light on the termination of the project.  ￿Phasing out￿ applies only to specific 
activities.  Without suggesting that CARE attempt to perpetuate itself ad infinitum, 
PROSPECT might ￿phase out￿ ABO training as the council staff take on that 
responsibility.  But PROSPECT (or CARE) may simultaneously need to take on new 
activities, such as continued advocacy for rationalizing competencies.  This implies 
transformation of CARE￿s aims and role in promoting CDD and good governance￿that 
is, the nature of the interactions with stakeholders changes, not simply ￿phasing out￿ or 
￿shutting down.￿ 
6.  Project termination, rather than ￿transformation￿ also creates staffing difficulties.  
Staff often see the end of the project as the end of employment and leave, 
especially well-qualified ones in high demand. 
PROSPECT, for example, was scheduled to end in early 2003, but received a no-
cost extension for about a year.  PROSPECT now faces the need to transform and to 
undertake new kinds of activities, but many experienced staff have already left.  If CARE 
and donors had agreed earlier on how to ￿transform￿ the project, with staff continuing in 
their position until CDD was reliably and sustainably part of government, perhaps these 
staff would have stayed. 57 
At some point, of course, CARE￿s assistance should end￿and the paid positions 
along with it.  But this brings out the need for organizations like CARE to develop 
organizations to be going concerns, with competent staff that can, for the most part, work 
permanently at the organization, moving from project to project as required.  Although, 
eventually, government or national organizations should replace CARE, in developing 
countries such as Zambia, international NGOs are still required to facilitate processes, 
engage in dialogue with stakeholders about policy, obtain funding, and strengthen and 
interact with partners on multiple levels.  These are some of the tasks remaining to ensure 
PROSPECT￿s accomplishments are sustained. 
7.  Donors must provide the right incentives for stakeholders to act to establish and 
promote CDD, especially through their monitoring and evaluation systems.  
Donors have a strong tendency to focus on physical outputs and financial flows to 
gauge the success of a project.  Almost all development projects, and most 
especially CDD, should be both process- and results-oriented. 
Donors should resist planning impacts and indicators before community needs 
have been identified.  They should instead set up monitoring and evaluation systems that 
gauge how successfully the facilitating or implementing organizations (say, CARE and 
the local government, respectively) are engaging the community, putting participatory 
and operating mechanisms into place, establishing a propitious environment, and building 
capacity to act. 
Rather quickly, donors should also identify what tangible, measurable benefits 
they expect as a result of the facilitating environment and increased community and 
government capacities.  This increases the pressure on local NGOs￿the implementing 
agents￿to perform and achieve results.  Likewise, the facilitating organization, such as 
CARE, has additional responsibility to monitor the NGOs and make sure they have the 
capacity to take action.  This focus on building capacity but then measuring it terms of 
tangible results ensures that the focus remains on understanding that CDD is supposed to 58 
help achieve greater and more lasting development results, not that the capacity is an end 
in itself. 
Pilot projects are especially important, then, because they allow the facilitating 
organizations to work out the bugs in their approach and also because they allow the 
donor to avoid committing funds for the long term (should a project turn out badly) and 
to assess and change the project as it develops.  Governments and the development 
community need to develop a new language for monitoring and evaluation that 
encourages the appropriate balance between process and results.  Monitoring and 
evaluation for CDD must emphasize learning and institution and capacity building in the 
early years, and then begin to hold agents accountable for tangible outcomes that later 
result from these actions.  Donors, governments, and facilitating and implementing 
organizations should consult on how to set up such an evaluation system and how to 
adjust budgeting mechanisms to support such a project when it is driven by community 
capacities and needs that are not always identifiable at the project outset. 
Interestingly, though more in CULP than PROSPECT, donors forced the issue of 
sustainability by not providing sufficient funding to support CARE￿s work.  CULP had to 
work within strict budget limits and with available structures.  Creating new structures 
would have required additional financial resources.  CARE then simply did not have the 
opportunity to create structures and processes that were not sustainable.  To achieve 
impact, CULP managers had to think strategically and negotiate the political 
environment.  Though this process took longer and was more hazardous, it means that 
when CULP ends, the structures are less likely to disappear:  they already exist and are 
owned and supported by the government and community. 
8.  The effectiveness of delivery depends to a large degree on the capacity of CARE 
and partners to carry out the process.  Scaling-up requires not only the appropriate 
enabling environment but also sufficient financing for the short- and long-term 
and capacities of all the players to take advantage of and play their roles in this 
environment. 59 
PROSPECT has focused more on training outputs and not on ensuring that ABOs 
are effective and functional and able to carry out CDD.  Although PROSPECT did help 
to build other infrastructure in response to community demand, such as police posts, 
latrines, and offices for planning agents and water revenue collection, the major focus 
was still water schemes and microfinance.  From the outset, PROSPECT should have 
identified which actors would carry out project activities; developed and implemented a 
program of capacity building and responsibility transfer; and made each step in this plan 
clear to project counterparts (along with assessing its own effectiveness in carrying out 
the plan and modifying actions as needed with time).  As it stands, counterparts simply 
knew that ￿CARE would leave,￿ but they had little idea of what they should do when it 
did leave.  Neither did they nor CARE have markers along the way to guide them in 
achieving their goal of taking over project management. 
Funding will also be a severe challenge to growth and consolidation of CDD.  The 
challenges come not only from the usual problem of ￿lack of funds,￿ but also, at the local 
level, from the attempt to establish new mechanisms and institutional arrangements to 
raise those funds.  At higher institutional levels, national and municipal governments and 
donors must be realistic about the resources needed to scale up effectively, as it involves 
not just building something or carrying out a service, but developing human capacities 
and establishing new ways of doing things.  And scaling-up means doing this multiple 
times. 
One way to marshal and make most effective use of resources would be to 
develop a framework and language for CDD that would be a primary strategy for the 
national PRSPs.  Governments and donors could then identify how existing approaches 
and resources support CDD and what actions, perhaps involving only limited additional 
resources, could catalyze these to implement CDD more widely as part of a poverty-
reduction strategy.  Clearly, this may not involve ￿scaling up￿ specific CDD projects as 
much as ￿scaling out￿ and spreading community-driven approaches. 
Overall, PROSPECT￿s experience is a useful illustration of the changes and 
challenges that affect initiatives to promote CDD over time.  While integration of the 60 
ABOs into local governance structures is a major accomplishment, a genuine example of 
scaling up CDD, this study makes clear that PROSPECT￿s longer-term impact is 
currently at risk.  Attention and action, if taken now, can preserve its impact and provide 
additional examples and insights into how to successfully, sustainably scale up CDD. 61 
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